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APPLICATION OF RULE 11 IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 111 has been a source of great controversy since its amendment in 1983. Prior to 1983, Rule 11 required attorneys
to sign pleadings to certify that they had read the pleading, that to the best
of their knowledge, information, and belief, good grounds existed to support
the pleading, and that they were not using the pleading for delay. 2 Old Rule
11 granted district courts discretion over whether or not to impose sanctions
for a violation, and the sanction for violation of old Rule 11 was to strike
the pleading as false.' Furthermore, the court could sanction an alleged
violator under a subjective bad faith standard. 4 In 1983, however, the

1. See FED. R. Civ. P., 97 F.R.D. 165, 196-7 (1983) [Hereinafter "Rule 11"] (stating
amended Rule 11). Amended Rule 11 provides:
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Sanctions
Every pleading, motion and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose-address
shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading,
motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by
affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be
overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes
a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper, that to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief [there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay] formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposedfor
any improperpurpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed,
it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the pleader or movant, [or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose
of this rule; it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as
though the pleading had not been served. For a wilful violation of this rule an
attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be
taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.] If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a representedparty, or both,
an appropriatesanction, which may include an order to pay the other party or
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney'sfee.
Id. (emphasis in original to show 1983 additions, brackets added to show deletions).
2. See FaD. R. Civ. P. 11, 97 F.R.D. 165, 196-97 (1983) [Hereinafter old Rule 11]
(stating that duty of signing attorney is to believe that pleading supported by good grounds
and not to submit pleading for purpose of delay).
3. See old Rule 11, supra note 2 (stating that sanction for pleading in violation of rule
was striking pleading as false). The language of old Rule 11 stated "it may be stricken as
sham and false ... [and] [flor a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
appropriate disciplinary action." Id. (emphasis added).
4. See Ripple & Saalman, Rule 11 in the Constitutional Case, 63 NoTRE DAME L. Rv.
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Federal Judiciary Committee on Rules amended old Rule 11 to alleviate the
growing costs, delays, and abuses developing in federal courts.5 Under the

new rule, district courts must sanction every violation of Rule 11.6 New
Rule 11 narrows the parameters of acceptable legal arguments that attorneys

may file in federal court by expanding attorneys' duties to the court to
include increased prefiling inquiry into the facts and legal issues surrounding
the case. 7 Additionally, attorneys have a duty not to file pleadings, motions,
or papers with an improper purpose' and have a continuing obligation 9 to
conduct adequate inquiry and maintain good faith purpose in subsequent
filings with the court.
Drafters of original Rule 11 intended the rule to check abuses in
pleadings.' 0 However, courts only imposed sanctions when an attorney failed
a subjective reasonableness or bad faith standard." Because judges were

788, 791-92 (1988) (stating that under old Rule 11 court had to find attorney's filing so
untenable that court could infer subjective bad faith); Note, Has a Kafkaesque Dream Come
True? Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11: Time for Another Amendment?, 67 B.U.L. REv.
1019, 1020-21 (1987) (authored by K. Rubin) (opining that old rule was ineffective because
judges applied only subjective good faith standard of reasonableness to attorney conduct).
Rubin notes that judges were reluctant to invoke Rule 11 because judges properly could
sanction only an attorney who had acted in bad faith. Id. at 1021; see also Grosberg, Illusion
and Reality in Regulating Lawyer Performance: Rethinking Rule 11, 32 VirL. L. R-v. 575,
591 (1987) (stating that lawyer's proof of subjective good faith was good defense under old
Rule 11 but is no longer safe harbor as to alleged violation under amended Rule 11).
5. See Ripple & Saalman, supra note 4 at 793 (explaining that purpose of amended
Rule 11 is to alleviate heavy case load in federal courts).
6. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (mandating that federal judges sanction every violation
of Rule 11). The relevant language of Rule 11 states that "[i]f a pleading ... is signed in
violation of this rule, the court ... shall impose upon the person who signed it ... an
appropriate sanction ... " Id.; with old Rule 11, supra note 2 (stating that courts "may"
sanction attorneys).
7. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring that signer of pleading make reasonable
inquiry to ensure that pleading is well grounded in fact and existing law); with old Rule 11,
supra note 2 (stating requirement that attorneys possess belief that good grounds exist to
support filing).
8. Compare FED. R. Cirv. P. 11 (including requirement that attorneys not submit papers
to court for any improper purpose); with old Rule 11, supra note 2 (not including improper
purpose as prong of old rule); see also Note, Critical Analysis of Rule 11 Sanctions in the
Seventh Circuit, 72 MRQ. L. Rnv. 91, 106 (1989) (noting expanded scope of improper purpose
to include not only delay but also harassment and unnecessary increase in litigation costs).
9. See FED. R. Crv. P. I1 (applying rule requirements to every pleading, motion, or
paper filed in court). One trial may well involve numerous pleadings or answers, and the
attorney has a continuing duty to conduct adequate inquiry into the basis for each subsequent
filing. Id. See Ripple & Saalman, supra note 4, at 800 (noting that although attorneys must
adhere to Rule 11 obligations to adequately inquire into facts and legal bases for subsequent
filings, most courts reject argument that attorneys have continuing obligation to reassess same
facts and law supporting original filings); Shaffer, Rule 11: Bright Light, Dim Future, 7 Rv.
op Lrr. 1, 12 (1987) (discussing cases in the Second, Seventh, and Fifth Circuits treating
continuing duty issue).
10. See FE. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (stating Rule 11 always was
intended as check on abusive pleadings) [Hereinafter Advisory Committee Notes].
11. See Untereiner, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE L.J. 901, 903-
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reluctant to label an attorney as having acted in bad faith, federal courts
rarely invoked the old rule. 2 Like the drafters of the original Rule 11, the
3
drafters of the amended rule intended Rule 11 to check abuses in pleadings.1
The Judicial Committee on Rules further planned for the language of the
1983 amendment, which made sanctions mandatory for every violation and
required the filer to ground a complaint in both facts and law, to reduce
the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions. 4 The drafters believed that an
increase in Rule 11 sanctions would curb dilatory or abusive tactics and
help streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or de-

fenses."5 The amended rule, consequently, has caused an increase in sanctions, and some practitioners and scholars attribute this increase to the
switch in the standard by which courts judge an attorney from a subjective
standard to an objective standard. 6 The Advisory Committee, however, was
aware of the risks involved in stepping up the use of sanctions and, therefore,
warned against using the rule to chill attorney enthusiasm or creativity in
7
pursuing meritorious factual or legal theories.
Although the amendment of Rule 11 has caused an increase in sanctions
as the drafters hoped it would, commentators debate whether the American

legal system has profited from the amendment.

8

Additionally, writers debate

4 (1988) (stating that amenders of Rule 11 changed standard of reasonableness attendant to
Rule 11 from subjective to objective to increase use of Rule 11); Note, supra note 4, at 102021 (opining that old rule ineffective because of subjective reasonableness standard).
12. See Ripple & SaaIman, supra note 4, at 792 (noting that judges were reluctant to
find bad faith in pleadings under old Rule 11 because judges preferred to reach merits of case
and to avoid punishing clients for attorney's bad faith); see also Note, supra note 4, at 1021
(noting that under old Rule 11 judges were reluctant to label attorney as possessing bad faith
because filed claim could have some merit).
13. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (requiring that litigants not submit pleading for improper
purpose such as to harass, to delay, or to increase cost of litigation); see also Advisory
Committee Notes, supra note 10 (noting that under Rule 11 intent of drafters of old Rule 11
to cut down abuses in pleadings was frustrated by rare invocation of old Rule 11).
14. See Advisory Committee Notes, supranote 10 (stating new language aspires to reduce
courts' reluctance to sanction Rule 11 violators).
15. See id. (stating that greater attention by courts to pleading abuses would discourage
abusive tactics, streamline litigation, and lessen frivolous claims or defenses).
16. See Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181, 196 (1985) (commenting that subjective bad faith standard increases costs to
judicial system and causes satellite litigation); Shaffer, supra note 9, at 4 (stating objective
standard is new guideline for Rule 11 violations); Note, Application of Rule 11 Sanctions in
the Ninth Circuit: Weapon or Nuisance, 24 WumArm
L. Rnv. 801, 804 (1988) (opining that
objective standard most likely is responsible for onslaught of Rule 11 litigation).
17. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (warning against Rule Il's use to chill
attorney enthusiasm in pursuing legal theories).
18. See Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 H-Lv. L. Ray. 1013, 1014 (1988) (praising
rule, and its purposes). But cf. Shaffer, supra note 9, at 3 (reporting no decrease in filings
since Rule l1's amendment). Mr. Shaffer also notes that benefits of Rule 11 are less significant
when compared with negative effects of Rule 11 which include a chilling effect that discourages
attorneys from the pursuit of sound legal theories and causes an increase in satellite litigation.
Id.
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whether the burdens of Rule 11 far outweigh the benefits that the new rule

brings to courts and advocates.' 9 In addition to controversy over the purposes
and burdens of new Rule 11, courts and lawyers also are confused regarding
differing applications of the rule among the circuits and within individual
circuits.20 Furthermore, practitioners and commentators argue that the drafters of Rule 11 and the courts invoking Rule 11 have
left the rule open to
21
varying interpretations and improper applications.
Unfortunately, Fourth Circuit Rule 11 cases support commentators'
arguments that Rule 11 lacks clarity.2" There are numerous Rule 11 issues
about which the Fourth Circuit fails to reach a consensus.23 The Fourth
Circuit has yet to publish a satisfactory opinion binding the district courts
to either an objective or subjective standard for review of attorney conduct
in Rule 11 cases.24 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit never has addressed the
issue of the appropriate manner in which to calculate the amount of a

19. See Shaffer, supra note 9, at 3 (stating that benefits of Rule 11 have not been
realized and problems with Rule 11 have resulted); Note, supra note 4, at 1022 (commenting
that question remains whether new Rule 11 creates more problems than it cures).
20. Although many applications of Rule 11 remain in dispute, the Supreme Court resolved
some disputed applications. For example, most circuits grappled with the issue of what standard
of review appellate courts should apply to a district court imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.
During the controversy the Fourth Circuit consistently applied an abuse of discretion standard.
See Donaldson v. Clark 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (1lth Cir. 1987) (applying two different standards
of review to Rule 11 sanctions; abuse of discretion and de novo review); Golden Eagle Distrib.
v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding legal questions subject to
de novo review and factual questions subject to clearly erroneous standard of review); Thomas
v. Capital Sec. Serv., 836 F.2d 866, 872 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding all Rule 11 sanctions subject
to abuse of discretion review); Note, Rule 11 in the Fifth Circuit after Thomas v. Capital
Security Services, Inc., 57 Miss L.J. 769, 771-75 (1987) (disfavoring abuse of discretion
standard in contrast with de novo standard of review). But see Nelson v. Piedmont Aviation,
750 F.2d 1234, 1238 (4th Cir. 1984) cert. denied 471 U.S. 1116 (1985) (adopting abuse of
discretion standard of review for Fourth Circuit Rule 11 decisions). The United States Supreme
Court decision in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990), resolved
controversy over the proper standard of review for Rule 11 decisions ruling that abuse of
discretion standard of review is appropriate standard for Rule 11 decisions. Id.
Another disputed issue hinging on Rule 11 was whether district courts retained jurisdiction
over sanctions under Rule 11 even after a voluntary dismissal of a suit. The Supreme Court
decision in Cooter & Gell also has cleared up controversy over Rule 11 jurisdiction of dismissed
actions ruling that a voluntary dismissal does not divest the district court of authority to
consider Rule 11 motions. Id. at 2457. Prior to the Supreme Court's resolution of the
jurisdiction question, the Fourth Circuit similarly had held in Langham-Hill Petroleum v.
Southern Fuels, 813 F.2d 1327, 1330 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 829 (1987), that a
request for attorney's fees was valid four and one-half months after judgement was entered
by the district court. Id.
21. See Shaffer, supra note 9, at 31 (summarizing Rule 11 case law and concluding that
courts disagree on how to use Rule 11 and that Rule 11 is inappropriately applied to borderline
violations).
22. See infra notes 34-291 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistent applications
of Rule 11 in Fourth Circuit).
23. Id.
24. See infra notes 34-99 and accompanying text (discussing controversy regarding
objective standard of reasonableness versus subjective standard of reasonableness).

1991]

RULE 11 SANCTIONS

sanction.2 Additionally, Fourth Circuit decisions inconsistently encourage
and discourage the district courts' use of procedural safeguards that may
be necessary to comport with due process requirements in a Rule 11
proceeding.2 Other issues in the Fourth Circuit include the manner in which
an attorney should assert a modification, expansion, or reversal of the law
in pleadings, 27 how a court should allocate sanctions between attorney and
client,n when the blame for a violation of Rule 11 may be shifted from the
lawyer to the client, 29 and whether pleadings, motions, or papers originally
30
filed in state court and removed to federal court are sanctionable.
The Fourth Circuit issues enumerated above also plague the other
circuits.3

1

As a result of the confusion over Rule 11 in the federal courts,

the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules, in August of 1990, published
and distributed a formal request for comments in preparation for possible
amendments to the rule.3 2 Because of the conflict in the courts and until

the Supreme Court addresses these issues or the Judicial Conference amends
Rule 11, the judicial system will not realize the intended purposes of Rule
11.33
(1)

SUBm Crvw

oR OBIEcnvE RF.sONABLENESS IN FUNG.

The first Rule 11 issue that Fourth Circuit courts confront is -whether
to apply an objective or subjective standard of reasonableness to the filing
in question. Fourth Circuit judges claim to adhere to a general rule that
federal judges should hold attorneys and clients to an objective reasonableness standard. 4 The objective reasonableness standard measures an attor-

25. See infra notes 100-130 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistent manner in
which Fourth Circuit calculates Rule 11 sanctions).
26. See infra notes 170-206 and accompanying text (discussing disagreement over appropriate procedural safeguards to Rule 11 sanctions).
27. See infra notes 207-233 and accompanying text (discussing confusion over how
properly to assert an intent to extend, modify, or reverse existing law).
28. See infra notes 234-253 and accompanying text (discussing allocation of sanctions
between attorney and represented party).
29. See infra notes 254-256 and accompanying text (discussing likelihood that attorney
may shift blame for frivolous filing to client and escape sanctions).
30. See infra notes 277-291 and accompanying text (discussing whether federal courts
may scrutinize under Rule 11 suits removed from state to federal court).
31. See Call For Written Comments on Rule 11 of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure
and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 344 (1990) (highlighting Rule 11 controversies present in United
States Courts of Appeals).
32. Id.
33. See supra note 20 (discussing Supreme Court's resolution of controversy over proper
standard of appellate review of district court imposition of Rule 11 sanctions). Courts may
make progress toward resolution of lingering confusion contiguous to Rule 11 if, as it did in
Cooter & Gell v. HartmarxCorp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990), the Supreme Court expressly rules
on troublesome issues. Id. Progress on a case by case basis, however, will be sluggish and a
better solution is for the Judicial Conference to clarify the rule itself.
34. See, e.g., In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990) (claiming to adhere to objective
standard of reasonableness standard of review), reh'g denied, No. 89-2815 (4th Cir. Oct. 11,
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ney's conduct against that of a reasonable attorney, given the available
facts and available legal precedent. If a reasonable attorney would not have
filed the pleading, motion,
or paper in question, an attorney filing such a
35
paper violates the rule.
Relying on the 1983 amendment to Rule 11, judges expressly applied

the objective reasonableness standard to litigants who failed to conduct
reasonable inquiry into factual grounds, failed to conduct reasonable inquiry
into legal basis for a claim, and failed to file a claim with a proper
purpose. 36 Neither the amended rule nor the Advisory Committee Notes,

however, expressly require adherence to an objective reasonableness standard. 37 The new rule, however, does apply to a wider range of attorney
conduct than does the old rule. 38 Furthermore, the drafters intended that
4
39
courts apply the new rule more strictly. These changes from the old rule,

0

coupled with the urgings of the Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 1141

have led the judiciary to interpret that the drafters' intent was for judges
to apply an objective instead of subjective standard of reasonableness to
42
Rule 11 disputes.

1990), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-807 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1990) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw);
United States v. Hamrick, 907 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir. June 12, 1990) (Unpublished, text on
Westlaw) (same); Almi Pictures, Inc. v. WFTY, Inc., 894 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 1990)
(Unpublished, text on Westlaw); Artco Corp. v. Lynnhaven Dry Storage Marina, 873 F.2d
1437 (4th Cir. Apr. 10, 1989) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw); Introcaso v. Cunningham, 857
F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1988); In re McKissick, 856 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 1988) (Unpublished,
text on Westlaw) (same).
35. See infra note 42 (citing cases wherein courts discuss objective standard as appropriate
standard for Rule 11 analysis).
36. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (omitting term "willful" from language of new rule);
Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (emphasizing drafter's intent to render Rule 11
more applicable to unreasonable filings). The drafters of the 1983 amended Rule 11 attempted
to make the rule more effective by doing away with the term "willful", thereby doing away
with the original rule's requirement that courts find the filer guilty of intentionally hindering
the legal process as determined by a subjective reasonableness analysis. Id.
37. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (including no express requirement that attorneys adhere to
objective standard of reasonableness); Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (same).
38. Compare FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (including stricter requirements that attorneys adequately
research factual and legal basis for claims); Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (noting
that new language stresses need for prefiling inquiry into both facts and law to satisfy duty
imposed by Rule 11); with old Rule 11, supra note 2 (not including express requirement that
attorneys research both factual and legal basis for claims).
39. Id.
40. See Rule 11, supra note 1 (noting changes from old Rule 11).
41. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (stating that amended Rule 11 designed
to reduce courts' reluctance to sanction through stricter review of attorney conduct).
42. See Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84, 88 (6th Cir. 1988) (reversing district court sanctions
based on subjective standard because drafters intended that standard of amended rule be more
stringent objective standard and apply to greater range of circumstances); Cabell v. Petty, 810
F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987) (interpreting both plain language of Rule 11 and Advisory
Committee Notes to mandate objective reasonableness standard); Zaldivar v. City of Los
Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
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Authorities are, for the most part, in agreement that courts should
judge an attorney's failure to ground a filing on adequate inquiry into the
facts or law according to an objective reasonableness standard.43 At least
one law review note has questioned, however, whether an objective standard
is appropriate for review of the improper purpose prong of a Rule 11
violation." The drafters specify harassing the court or the opposing party
or causing unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation
as examples of improper purpose violations. 41 Because the offending party
intentionally commits the conduct that the rule labels improper, one federal
46
district court judge held that a mens rea element accompanies such conduct.
Adopting this argument, commentators note that courts should consider
subjective elements in reviewing an alleged filing for improper purpose.47

43. See Cabell, 810 F.2d at 466 (applying objective standard of reasonableness); Hsiung,
Legal Ethics: Rule 11 Sanctions: Reasonable Inquiry, Standards of Review, Due Process
Concerns, 1987 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 373, 381 (1987) (stating that most federal courts adopted
objective standard under language of Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 823 or Eastway Constr. Corp. v.
City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2nd Cir. 1985) remanded, 637 F. Supp. 558 (E.D.N.Y.
1986), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987)). But see Eastway
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F.Supp 558, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating review of
attorney's inquiry into factual or legal basis of suit involves both objective and subjective
analysis), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S 918 (1987).
44. See Note, supra note 4, at 1031-32 (discussing subjectivity of improper purpose
analysis). The confusion over the appropriate standard of conduct for Rule 11 became evident
in the first major decision evaluating the amended rule. See Eastway, 762 F.2d at 253-54
(claiming to apply objective bad faith standard but actually applying dual standard). The
Eastway court stated that, "sanctions shall be imposed ... when it appears that a pleading
has been interposed for any improper purpose, or where, after reasonable inquiry, a competent
attorney could not form a reasonable belief that the pleading is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law[.]" Id. at 254 (emphasis in the original). Given the "or where" in
the court's ruling, the reasonable inquiry only necessarily applied to the factual and legal basis
for the claim and not to the improper purpose prong; Note, supra note 4, at 1031-32; see also
Note, Rule 11 Sanctions: ContrastingApplications in the Second and Fourth Circuits, 46 MD.
L. REv. 470, 479-80 (1987) (noting improper purpose findings in Fourth Circuit decisions may
reflect lingering influence of old Rule 11 and its subjective bad faith standard); Note, Rule 11
Sanctions: Toward JudicialRestraint, 26 WAsHBuRN L.J. 337, 367-69 (1987) (suggesting that
drafters intended courts to compare own conclusions of what reasonable attorney would
conclude with what counsel actually concluded). If this comparison reflects that the attorney
was unreasonable the court may presume the attorney intended to harass the court. Id.
45. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (stating that suit is interposed for improper purpose under
Rule 11 if it constitutes harassment or causes unnecessary delay or needless increase in litigation
costs).
46. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F.Supp. 558, 567 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) (holding courts should not subject attorneys to penal rule in which attorney intent or
mens rea to act improperly is unnecessary to punish offender), modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d
Cir.) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
47. See Note, Rule 11 Sanctions: Toward Judicial Restraint, 26 WAsHBuRN L.J. 337,
361-65 (discussing intent as element of improper purpose violation of Rule 11). The author
expresses concern over courts' refusal to examine an attorney's subjective intent in determinationof Rule 11 violations. Id. The author argues that a court's refusal to examine intent prior to
sanctioning an attorney under a punitive statute results in compromises to an attorney's due
process rights. Id.; see also Hsiung, supra note 43, at 381-86 (recognizing validity of Judge
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Following this line of reasoning, a recent, Fourth Circuit opinion, In re
Kunstler,48 challenged the established objective standard by holding an
attorney's subjective purpose in signing a claim to be an appropriate
consideration to an improper purpose analysis. 49
Prior to Judge Chapman's express challenge to the objective standard
in In re Kunstler,0 Fourth Circuit judges purported to adhere to a strict
objective standard for all prongs of the rule, which include legal inquiry,
factual inquiry, and improper purpose.5 ' However, several Fourth Circuit
cases decided prior to In re Kunstler seemed to contradict judges' claims to
adhere to an objective standard.5 2 For example, Judge Haynsworth's unpublished opinion deciding In re McKissick53 illustrates the confusion between objective and subjective review of an attorney's alleged failure to
adequately research a claim. 5 4 The McKissick court decided whether the
district court correctly had applied an objective standard of reasonableness
in ruling that an attorney had failed to adequately inquire into the legal
and factual basis of a claim.55 In McKissick, an attorney represented a client
who sued a local prosecuting attorney and the North Carolina Bureau of
Investigation under 42 U.S.C. section 198356 alleging that the local prosecutor's investigation of a client's financial affairs was racially motivated.5 7
Weinstein's opinion in Eastway, 637 F. Supp. at 558, and suggesting that courts consider
subjective elements to determine what is reasonable under circumstances).
48. 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, No. 89-2815 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 1990),
petition for cert. filed, No. 90-807 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1990).
49. See In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 512 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding signer's subjective
intent appropriate consideration in deciding signer's purpose in filing suit), No. 89-2815 (4th
Cir. Oct. 11, 1990), petitionfor cert. filed, No. 90-807 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1990). In In re Kunstler
the court clearly reveals the inconsistency in applying an objective analysis to a signer's purpose
in filing by stating that "[t]here is some paradox involved in this analysis, because it is
appropriate to consider the signer's subjective beliefs to determine the signer's purpose in filing
suit, if such beliefs are revealed through an admission that the signer knew that the motion
or pleading was baseless but filed it nonetheless." Id. at 519, (emphasis in the original). The
court then qualifies its apparent rejection of the objective improper purpose test by stating
that "[tihis evidence may be said to be 'objective' in the sense that it can be viewed by a
court without fear of misinterpretation[.]" Id.
50. Id.
51. See infra notes 51-91 and accompanying text (discussing cases wherein Fourth Circuit
judges purport to adhere to objective reasonableness standard in analyzing Rule 11 disputes).
52. See Blair v. Shenandoah Women's Center, Inc., 757 F.2d 1435, 1438 (4th Cir. 1985)
(exhibiting failure to adhere to purely objective analysis of attorney conduct in Rule 11 cases);
see also infra notes 53-91 and accompanying text (discussing three Fourth Circuit cases
exhibiting failure to adhere to purely objective analysis of attorney conduct in Rule 11 cases).
53. 856 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 1988) (Unpublished, text on Westiaw).
54. See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text (explaining inconsistency between
McKissick court's claim to apply objective standard and court's inclusion of subjective
considerations in opinion).
55. In re McKissick, 856 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 1988) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw
at 7) [Page numbers for all unpublished cases cited in this note refer to Westlaw computer
screen number on which cited text is displayed].
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) [hereinafter section 1983] (giving plaintiffs right of
action for deprivation of civil rights by persons acting under state law).
57. McKissick, 856 F.2d at 3-4.
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The district court dismissed the civil rights action in an unpublished opinion
and required McKissick to show why the court should not sanction McKissick.58 McKissick offered a substantial affidavit that stated the basis for
filing the suit.5 9 At the sanctions hearing, however, the district court declined
to consider any additional information, stating that the affidavit came too
late and relied solely on the pleadings, motions, and other papers filed in
the underlying action. 60 Consequently, concluding that McKissick had not
acted reasonably when he filed the complaint, the district court sanctioned
McKissick. 61
On appeal, Judge Haynsworth held that the excluded, additional information that McKissick supplied should have been the most important focus
of the district court's inquiry. 62 According to the court, McKissick's affidavit
could have made believable McKissick's claim of reasonableness, and,
therefore, the district court had inappropriately limited the record and
abused its discretion.63 Although this decision purports to enforce an objective reasonableness standard, the appellate court's consideration of
McKissick's explanatory affidavit is a subjective inquiry into individual
reasons for filing the complaint." The Fourth Circuit, in effect, rejected
the true objective inquiry that the district court performed when the district
court refused to consider any information other than the pleadings filed in
65
the underlying action.
In addition to the Fourth Circuit's erroneous attempt to apply an
objective standard to the alleged violation in McKissick, the Fourth Circuit
also fails to adhere to an objective inquiry when analyzing a district court's
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against a litigant sanctioned for improper
purpose." For example, in Chu v. Griffith67 the Fourth Circuit considered
whether to uphold the district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions
against the plaintiffs' attorney." In Chu the plaintiffs filed a section 1983
claim for damages in federal district court against a judge who was presiding
over the plaintiffs' contested divorce proceedings and had ordered the
plaintiffs' children into the temporary custody of the state. 69 The plaintiffs
alleged that the judge violated their civil rights by depriving them of custody
of their children. 70 The district court dismissed the action against the judge
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id. at 6.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 7-8.
63. Id. at 8.
64. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (explaining district court's refusal to
consider facts not on record at trial and appellate court's belief that consideration of affidavit
proper).
65. Id.
66. See infra notes 68-83 and accompanying text (discussing courts' tendency to allow

subjective considerations into Rule 11 improper purpose analysis).
67. 771 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1985).
68. Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 80 (4th Cir. 1985).

69. Id. at 81.
70. Id.
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and imposed Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiffs' attorney for failure
to show an adequate legal basis for the claim and for filing the claim with
an improper purpose.7 ' The Fourth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that because
a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of the
judge's performance of judicial duties, the plaintiffs had no legal basis for
the claim.7 2 Furthermore, concluding that the plaintiffs filed the damages
claim in an attempt to compel the judge to recuse himself from the divorce
and custody proceeding, the Fourth Circuit approved the district court's
finding of improper purpose.3
Because both the district court and the Fourth Circuit relied on the
finding of attempt or mens rea, the Fourth Circuit applied a subjective
reasonableness standard.74 Because an objective analysis omits evidence of
an individual's intent, a true objective analysis of the plaintiff's action in
Chu would have resulted in the court's finding only that the plaintiffs
lacked an adequate legal basis for filing the complaint. 7 1 Specifically, had
the court applied an objective standard, the court would have excluded
from its consideration the plaintiffs' underlying intent to compel the judge
76
to recuse himself.
Similarly, in Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.,7 the Fourth
Circuit applied a subjective-analysis to the plaintiff's purpose in filing a
motion.7 8 In Cohen the Fourth Circuit decided whether to uphold a district
court sanction for improper purpose under Rule 11.9 The plaintiff filed a
motion to amend the plaintiffs original complaint following the district
court's dismissal of a portion of the plaintiff's copyright infringement
action.w0 Despite the district court's finding that the plaintiff had legal
grounds to file the motion to amend, the district court sanctioned the
plaintiff for improper purpose when the court discovered that the plaintiff
and his attorney had decided in advance to withdraw the motion if the
defendant indicated any opposition to its amendment. 8' In affirming Rule
11 sanctions the Fourth Circuit reasoned that if the plaintiff did not want
to displease its opponent by amending its motion, the plaintiff could have
contacted the defendant informally to discover whether the defendant would
object.Y Instead, the plaintiff wasted judicial resources by filing a motion

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 80.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id.

75. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussing objective reasonableness
standard of attorney conduct).

76. Id.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986).
Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 788 F.2d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 1986).
Id.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 249.
Id.
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that the plaintiff did not intend to pursue if it were opposed., 3 Because an
objective analysis of the plaintiff's motion would not have taken into
consideration the plaintiff's personal mens rea, the Fourth Circuit's affirmance of Rule 11 sanctions supports the conclusion that courts often apply
a subjective analysis to an improper purpose violation.84 Consequently,
under a purely objective analysis, the court would not have sanctioned the
plaintiff's plan to withdraw the motion upon objection, which resulted in
the expending of judicial resources and exhaustive research on the part of
the defendant.
Writers make a strong argument, therefore, that the term "improper
purpose" necessarily requires an intent on the part of the person filing a
pleading, motion, or other paper, to deceive or take advantage of the legal
process.85 For judges to label an attorney's conduct improper is perhaps
impossible without inquiring into the attorney's motivations precedent to
every action instituted in court. One court, frustrated by this incongruity,
reasoned that applying a penal rule to lawyers without a subjective guilt
8 6
standard is an offense to American penal and professional traditions.
Accordingly, commentators attribute the reluctance to apply an objective
reasonableness standard in improper purpose cases to a court's desire not
to curb attorney creativity through penal sanctionsY If courts only impose
sanctions when the offender exhibits mens rea, courts.wiil not chill attorney
creativity and enthusiasm. 8 However, if courts sanction attorneys according
to the objective reasonableness of attorney judgment, attorneys might never
assert questionable causes of action. 9
Fourth Circuit decisions show that courts necessarily must review an
attorney's subjective reasonableness to determine whether an attorney filed
with an improper purpose.9 The objective reasonableness standard is proper
to analyze an attorney's investigation into the factual or legal grounds of
a claim because the available facts in a case are the same for any attorney
taking the case and all attorneys have access to appropriate precedent in

83. Id.
84. See supra notes 50-84 and accompanying text (discussing courts' tendency to allow
subjective considerations into Rule 11 improper purpose analysis).
85. See supranote 44 (citing articles wherein writers discuss cases that illustrate confusion
over what standard, subjective or objective, is appropriate for Rule 11 analysis in general).
86. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 567 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) modified, 821 F.2d 121 (2d. Cir.) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987) (revealing Judge
Weinstein's apparent rejection of objective standard for penal Rule 11), modified, 821 F.2d
121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
87. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (stating that Rule 11 was not intended
to chill attorney enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories).
88. See Note, supra note 47, at 370 (recognizing drafters' intent to chill certain types of

creativity and certain courts' sensitivity to dangers of chilling).
89. Id.
90. See supra notes 50-83 and accompanying text (analyzing Fourth Circuit cases containing subjective standards for review of attorney conduct).
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their jurisdictions. 9' On the other hand, the intentions and wishes of
individual litigants and the litigants' attorneys are not universally available.Y
Therefore, the application of an objective reasonableness standard to the
improper purpose prong of Rule 11 is inappropriate and impossible.
According to some writers, however, the elements of subjectivity compromise the purposes of Rule 11 and, therefore, should be eliminated. 9
Specifically, these writers argue that decisions based on an attorney's honest
belief ignore the attorney's duty to plead responsibly under the rule.9 Using
Fourth Circuit decisions as a model, the more convincing argument is that
courts should limit the objective reasonableness requirement to the factual
and legal inquiry prongs and that courts should apply a subjective test to
the improper purpose prong. Similarly, one Fourth Circuit judge suggests
that courts should consider the attorney's factual and legal inquiry before
moving to an investigation of improper purpose to ensure that the court
applies the proper standard to each issue.95 As is shown in McKissick, Chu,
and Cohen, the subjective inquiry is not overburdensome and results in
punishment for improper filings.9 Additionally, when a Rule 11 movant
calls a litigant's intentions into question, the equitable procedure is for the
moving party to air grounds for suspicion and for the responding party to
explain the conduct called into question.Y As was stated in In re Kunstler,
it is appropriate for a finder of fact to consider a signer's subjective
intention in filing a motion, if such intentions reveal the signer's knowledge
that a suit was groundless. 9 Additionally, the judge also should consider
intentions which reveal that the signer had no improper motives.9

91. See Schwarzer, supra note 18, at 1022-23 (expounding benefits of reasonable inquiry
analysis of attorney's duty to research facts and law supporting claim).
92. See Shaffer, supra note 9, at 13-14 (recognizing subjective elements necessarily
included in determining improper purpose); Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended FederalRule
11, 74 GEo L.J. 1313, 1320 (1986) (stating that the improper purpose standard requires court
to attempt to fathom motives of the signer).
93. See Schwarzer, supra note 16 (encouraging firm objective standard); Note, supra
note 4, at 1043-44 (criticizing use of subjective standard).
94. Note, supra note 4, at 1043.
95. See In re Kunstier, 914 F.2d 505, 518 (4th Cir. 1990) (recommending that district
court consider first two prongs of Rule 11 before improper purpose prong), reh'g denied, No.
89-2815 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 1990), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-807 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1990).
Judge Chapman explained that the district court discussed improper purpose ii its opinion
before discussing the possibility of factual and legal support for the claim. Id. In Judge
Chapman's view the outcome of an inquiry into an attorney's legal and factual basis of the
claim will often influence the determination of the signer's purpose. Id. Chapman suggested,
therefore, that the district court consider the legal and factual prongs of the rule first. Id.
96. See supra notes 50-83 and accompanying text (analyzing Fourth Circuit cases containing subjective elements in Rule 11 findings).
97. See Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 522 (discussing that court denial of Rule 11 offender's
right to be heard is violation of due process rights).
98. Id. at 512.
99. Id.
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(2) AMOUNT

OF

SANCTION

A second Rule 11 issue confronting the Fourth Circuit is the proper
calculation of sanction amounts. The relevant language of Rule 11 permits
federal courts to order sanctions awarding expenses including reasonable
attorney fees to a party harmed by a frivolous filing.' °0 As Rule 11 authorizes
and the advisory committee notes explain, the Fourth Circuit affords the
district courts broad discretion to determine the appropriate amount of
sanction.'0 ' Rule 11 does not require that the offender compensate full
attorney fees, and the Fourth Circuit has taken advantage of this leniency.' 02
However, the Fourth Circuit has not adopted a uniform method of sanctioning or a uniform method of calculating sanctions. For example, the
Fourth Circuit has both awarded and reversed sanctions equalling the full
costs of litigation to the opposing side.' °3 Additionally, some Fourth Circuit
judges consider mitigating factors of a case, such as time constraints on

100. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 11 (authorizing sanctions constituting amount of attorney fees
incurred in defending frivolous suit).
101. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (granting sanctioning court authority to impose an appropriate
sanction); Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (stating that district court has discretion
to fashion sanction appropriate to facts of case); see also Introcaso v. Cunningham, 857 F.2d
965, 970 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that imposition of commensurate sanction is within province
of the district court); Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that
language of Rule 11 leaves questions of amount of sanction to district court's discretion);
Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d 984, 988 (4th Cir. 1987) (same);
Green v. Foley, 907 F.2d 11.37 (4th Cir. 1990) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 6) (same),
cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.257 (1990)).
102. See Basch v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 777 F.2d 165, 174 (4th Cir. 1985) (awarding
nonviolating party only fraction of attorney's fees) cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986). In
Basch the district court found that the plaintiffs abused the discovery procedure in failing
truthfully and timely to reveal the identity of their expert witness. Id. at 174. Given the time
constraints confronting the defendants' lawyers, the law firm, believing the plaintiffs' expert
witness to be adverse to the defendant, sent a partner to depose the plaintiffs expert witness.
Id. at 173. The witness during the deposition identified himself as a "witness of fact without
prejudice to either side[.]" Id. Had the defendant known the true nature of the witness, an
associate instead of a partner with the defending law firm would have been sent to conduct
the deposition. Id. at 174. Judge Murhaghan affirmed the district court's sanction amounts,
which consisted of the fee difference between a partner's hourly rate and the hourly rate of
an associate, in addition to the cost to the corporation of prosecuting the motion for sanctions.

Id.
103. See Local Union No. 24 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Daigle Elec. Service, Inc.,
818 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. Apr. 30, 1987) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 3) (validating sanction
although sanction amount in excess of costs associated with the pleading that violated Rule
11). In Electric Workers the Fourth Circuit rejected the contention that a sanction under Rule
11 should not exceed the costs attributable to services rendered in responding to a frivolous
defense. Id. The Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court had discretion to fix the sanction
in the amount of attorney's fees for the entire case if that court thought it appropriate. Id.
But cf. Corcoran v. IBM, 896 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. Jan. 30, 1990) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw
at 9-10) (remanding sanctions totalling full costs of fees for opposing party for recalculation),
reh'g denied, (4th Cir. Mar. 13, 1990); In re Scarlett, 907 F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. June 12, 1990)
(Unpublished, text on Westiaw at 3) (same).
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filing or the inexperience of an attorney and, then, decrease or reverse the
amount of sanction."1 4
When district courts choose to base the amount of Rule 11 sanctions
on legal costs, the courts rely on a fee statement that the nonviolating party
provides the court. 0 s When a district courts finds a fee statement to be
6

unreasonably large, the court discounts the fee statement by a percentage'
or by dividing the amount stated in half.' 7 Although large sanctions are
within the boundaries of the rule, little justification exists for large sanctions
that financially may cripple an attorney because the rule's primary purpose

is deterrence and not reimbursement. 10 In most cases a sanction of any
amount will deter an attorney- from future frivolous filings. Courts must
take caution, therefore, not to chill unnecessarily attorney enthusiasm that
could result in decreased filings of meritorious suits. 1°9 To curb the imposition of severe sanctions, the Fourth Circuit considers mitigating factors in
104. See Blue v. United States Dept of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 546 (4th Cir. 1990) (reversing
district court sanction of inexperienced attorney taking into consideration inexperience, late
entry into litigation, and subordination to more experienced attorney), petition for cert. filed,
No. 90-1076 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1990); Corcoran, 896 F.2d 545 (text on Westlaw at 9-10) (remanding
sanction amount to district court for recalculation in accordance with mitigating factors first
outlined in Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S.
934 (1978)). The Barber mitigating factors include: (1) time and labor expended; (2) novelty
and difficulty of the legal questions raised; (3) skill required properly to perform the legal
services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the
customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of litigation; (7) the
time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the
results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and
length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees
awards in similar cases. Barber, 577 F.2d at 226 n.28; see also Poindexter v. Town of Rocky
Mount, 849 F.2d 606 (4th Cir. June 9, 1988) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 7) (affirming
district court sanction amount in approval of district court's adherence Barbers factors) cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 968 (1988).
105. See e.g., Scarlett, 907 F.2d at 1139 (Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 5) (discussing
requested sanctions based on fee statement submitted by nonviolating party); Corcoran, 896
F.2d at 545 (text on Westlaw at 8-9) (same); In re Fallin, 888 F.2d 1385 (4th Cir. Oct. 11,
1989) (Unpublished, text on Westaw at 4) (same); Zaidi v. Edwards, 829 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir.
Sept. 22, 1987) (Unpublished, text on Westaw at 3) (same).
106. See Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d 984, 988 (4th Cir.
1987) (finding case to be over-lawyered and, therefore, reducing requested fees by 10% to
reflect local rate).
107. See Almi Pictures, Inc. v. WFTY, Inc., 894 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 1990)
(Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 10) (dividing attorney's fees statement in half when court
found bill unreasonably large).
108. See In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 522 (4th Cir. 1990) (vacating sanction imposed by
district court finding sanction too large), reh'g denied, No. 89-2815 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 1990),
petition for cert. filed, No. 90-807 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1990). The Fourth Circuit held that the
sanction amount should reflect the primary purpose of rule which is deterrence, not punishment.
Id.; see also Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that courts should
impose least severe sanction adequate to serve purposes of Rule 11).
109. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (warning courts not to unnecessarily
chili attorneys with Rule 11 and thereby prevent filings of meritorious suits).
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setting the sanction amount." 0 In many cases, judges adhere to the well-

known principle that courts should impose only the least severe sanction
adequate to serve the purpose of the rule."' Accordingly, appellate courts
generally do not disturb district court calculations of small awards. The
appellate courts are concerned, however, about large, unjustified awards
and, thus, remand2 for clarification cases in which the district court imposes
severe sanctions."
On the other end of the spectrum, the Fourth Circuit also has affirmed
nonmonetary sanctions absent specific findings of cost."' The language of
the rule contains no express requirement that a sanction be monetary." 4
The Fourth Circuit typically imposes monetary sanctions, but the Fourth
Circuit also has used threats and reprimands to punish a Rule 11 violator."

110. See Blue v. United States Dept. of Army, 914 F.2d 525, 546 (4th Cir. 1990) (reversing
district court sanctioning of inexperienced attorney taking into consideration inexperience, late
entry into litigation, and subordination to more experienced attorney), petition for cert. filed,
No. 90-1076 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1990); Corcoran v. I.B.M., 896 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. Jan. 30, 1990)
(Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 9) (remanding sanction amount to district court for recalculation in accordance with mitigating factors first outlined in Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc., 577
F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 934 (1978)); see also Poindexter v. Town
of Rocky Mount, 849 F.2d 606 (4th Cir. June 9, 1988) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 7)
(affirming district court sanction amount and approving district court's adherence to factors
in Barber); supra note 104 (listing Barber mitigating factors).
111. See Green v. Foley, 907 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir. June 6, 1990) (Unpublished, text on
Westlaw at 16) (citing Cabell, 810 F.2d at 466, wherein court justified low award because
purpose of Rule 11 is to deter rather than to punish); Cabell, 810 F.2d at 466 (citing Schwarzer,
infra who argued that courts should merely reprimand attorney for attorney's first violation
of Rule 11); see also Schwarzer, supra note 16 (stating basic Rule 11 principle that courts
should impose least severe sanctions adequate to serve purposes of Rule 11).
112. See In re Scarlett, 907 F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. June 12, 1990) (Unpublished, text on
Westlaw at 10-11) (remanding for explanation of sanction amount). In Scarlett the Fourth
Circuit remanded the case for the district court to clarify the basis for the amount awarded.
Id. at 11. The court suggests that a better choice for the court would be to apportion the
award between the client and the attorney because the client's actions were "particularly
offensive" while the attorney's violation was more a result of inexperience. Id.; see also
Corcoran, 896 F.2d at 545 (text on Westlaw at 10) (remanding for explanation of sanctions
amount); infra notes 234-253 and accompanying text (discussing apportionment of awards
between attorneys and clients).
113. See Baldwin v. Boone, 812 F.2d 1400 (4th Cir. Feb. 6, 1987) (Unpublished, text on
Westlaw at 4) (affirming district court sanction consisting of reprimand and threat to take
25% percent of prisoner's prison trust account).
114. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 11 (omitting requirement that Rule 11 sanction must be
monetary). Rule 11 provides that an appropriate sanction may include an order to pay the
other party reasonable expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Id. (emphasis added).
115. See Baldwin, 812 F.2d at 1400 (text on Westlaw at 3) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions
on plaintiff consisting of threat to deduct two $200 from plaintiff's prison trust account). In
Baldwin the plaintiff was a prison inmate who had filed previous suits in federal court on the
identical subject matter addressed in the current suit. Id. at 2. The judge found that the
plaintiff violated Rule 11 by giving a fraudulent answer to the court when asked whether he
had previously filed portions of his claim in federal court. Id.; see also Stevens v. Lawyers
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 1056, 1059 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing Rule 11 sanction
constituting reprimand). In Stevens the district court sanctioned the petitioner through a
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The Fourth Circuit tolerates the disparity between large monetary awards

and nonmonetary or small monetary awards because the primary purpose
of the rule is not to reimburse the other side but rather to punish and deter
the offending party from violation of the rule in the future. 16 Additionally,
Rule 11 and the Advisory Committee Notes leave to the district court the
7
task of designing an appropriate sanction."
Courts also sanction attorneys for their efforts to appeal sanctions
imposed against them."' Before the Supreme Court's decision in Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx Corporation,"9 the cost to the successful Rule 11 movant
of defending an appeal from an imposition of Rule 11 sanctions could
affect the amount that the attorney eventually might owe in total sanctions.20
The Cooter & Gell case presented three issues to the Supreme Court. 2' The
first was whether to uphold a district court's affirmation of sanctions
against a party who voluntarily had dismissed that party's own complaint.1 2
Secondly, the Court ruled on the appropriate standard of appellate review
of a Rule 11 sanction.'2 Finally, the Court decided whether Rule 11
authorizes sanctions for a frivolous appeal of sanctions imposed in an
underlying dispute.'l In Cooter & Gell the petitioner filed claims of antitrust
violations against the respondent.'2 The respondent replied with a motion
to dismiss and, alleging inadequate factual basis to support the petitioner's
claim, a motion for Rule 11 sanctions.'2 The district court found that the

reprimand. Id. at 1059. The Fourth Circuit reversed the sanction on other grounds. Id.; In re
McKissick, 856 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. Aug. 16, 1988) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 6)
(reversing on other grounds district court's Rule 11 sanction constituting reprimand).
116. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456, 460 (1989)
(ruling that reimbursement is not the purpose of Rule 11) remanded, 907 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1990). In Pavelic & LeFlore the Supreme Court held that the purpose of Rule 11 was to stress
to the individual signer the importance and nondelegability of the signer's duty to the court.
Id. at 460.
117. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (stating that upon violation court shall impose an appropriate
sanction); Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (noting that courts retain flexibility to
deal with circumstances of each case appropriately).
118. See Stevens, 789 F.2d at 1061-62 (denying plaintiff's motion for sanctions and
sanctioning plaintiff's motion for sanctions under Rule 11); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81
(4th Cir. 1985) (imposing sanctions for cost to opposition of defending sanction motion). In
Chu the plaintiff sued a judge in the face of settled law that a judge is absolutely immune
from claims for damages. Id.
119. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
120. See Chu, 771 F.2d at 81 (imposing sanctions for cost of sanction motion). But see
Introcaso v. Cunaingham, 857 F.2d 965, 970 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding costs of litigation not
compensable following grant of motion to dismiss, including costs of motion for attorney's
fees under Rule 11 even if stemming from signing of pleading proscribed by Rule 11).
121. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2451 (1990) (holding that
costs to defend an appeal of Rule 11 sanction not sanctionable under Rule 11).
122. Id. at 2452.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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petitioner violated Rule 11 in filing the complaint and awarded attorney
fees to the respondent based on the costs of answering the frivolous claim. 2 7
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the Rule 11
sanction imposed by the district court and awarded the respondent costs
for defending the Rule 11 award on appea.1.' The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the sanctions but reversed the award of costs for defending
the sanctions on appeal reasoning that Rule 11 does not apply to appellate
proceedings because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only govern
procedure in United States district courts. 29 Because an appeal of sanctions
is filed in circuit court and not district court, no grounds exist for the
argument that Rule 11 authorizes sanctions for motions not filed in district
court. 130
In addition to barring sanctions on actions not filed in federal district
court, the Fourth Circuit urges litigants to keep costs, which form the basis
for many monetary sanctions, to a minimum.' To keep sanction amounts
low, the Fourth Circuit imposes a duty of reasonable efficiency on the
successful Rule 11 movant to attend to legal matters, specifically the cost
of a motion for sanctions, at low cost. 3 2 Judge Wilkinson expressed the
33
wisdom of this policy in Blue v. United States Department of the Army.
In Blue Judge Wilkinson extensively analyzed the amount of the district
court's sanction award.1 34 The plaintiffs in Blue retained an experienced
civil rights attorney who first filed suit in federal court in September of
1981 .'3 The attorney filed the case as a class action with five representa127. Id.at 2453.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 2457, 2461 (holding that courts should understand that Rule 11 allows
awards only for costs resulting from filings at trial court level).
130. Id. at 2463.
131. See infra notes 131-169 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit case
imposing duty of efficiency on successful Rule 11 movants to keep costs associated with
frivolous filing at minimum).
132. See Corcoran v. I.B.M., 896 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. Jan. 30, 1990) (Unpublished, text
on Westlaw at 9) (admonishing district court's imposition of large sanction and defendant's
over-lawyering of case and remanding award for clarification of amount). In Corcoran the
court stated,
The issue of sanctions, though not particularly savory, is not a thorny or complicated
matter of law requiring extensive research, deliberation, or tactical maneuvering...
Accordingly, we find that the exertion of 312.6 hours of attorney and paralegal time
preparing a 20-page memorandum in support of such a motion was an inefficient
and excessive use of manpower for which the appellant should not now be required
to pay. Here, the attorneys of record for IBM are all professionals of ability; the
fees they command are high. We believe that with such recognition arises a duty of
reasonable efficiency in attending to legal matters[, and] the allowance of $30,000
for such efforts was an abuse of discretion.
Id.
133. 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-1076 (U.S. Dec. 17,

1990).
134. Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 548-49 (4th Cir. 1990),
petition for cert. filed, No. 90-1076 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1990).
135. Id. at 531.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 48:621

tives. 13 6 The plaintiffs alleged that the Army had discriminated against them
on the basis of race with respect to their employment.3 7 The case became
an appeal of the largest employment discrimination class action ever filed
against the United States Army.' A year after filing suit, the plaintiffs'
attorney turned the case over to a junior associate who was eighteen months
out of law school and six months out of a judicial clerkship.3 9
The trial of the first plaintiff's case began in January of 1984. The
pretrial brief omitted several of the claims that the plaintiff originally had
alleged, and the court took under advisement the Army's motion to sanction
the plaintiffs for abandonment of claims.' 40 Over the next few months and
prior to a final judgement on the merits, a significant number of the
plaintiffs withdrew their claims.' 4' The district court subsequently rejected
all the remaining claims as frivolous and awarded sanctions against two
members of the class for committing perjury on the stand and against
plaintiffs' attorneys for violating Rule 11.142
The district court found that the plaintiffs' attorneys violated Rule 11
by filing frivolous claims and acting in bad faith. 43 The district court
imposed every conceivable sanction against the attorneys, including but not
limited to, court costs, attorney fees, court salaries (including the salary of
the court's law clerk), a fine, and a reprimand for violation of state ethical
rules.'44
On appeal Judge Wilkinson warned district courts against the temptation
to conclude that a plaintiff who loses in court is necessarily asserting an
unreasonable complaint. 14 Judge Wilkinson stressed that the civil rights
movement of the 1960's could not have withstood Rule 11 if overzealous
sanctioning had existed.'" However, Judge Wilkinson went on to say that
the same standards of legal equality sought by civil rights plaintiffs require
47
all plaintiffs not to pursue patently frivolous lawsuits.
On the merits, the Fourth Circuit agreed that sanctions were warranted
against both plaintiffs and plaintiffs' counsel.'" Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit rejected all the plaintiffs' arguments in support of reversing the
sanctions. 49 First, the court denied the plaintiffs' claim that the ability to
establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination should be a shield from

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

532.

535.
534.
534-35.
544.
536-44.
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sanctions. 50 Judge Wilkinson found that because the threshold requirements
for a prima facie case are very low and because the process of discovery
brings to light the unreasonableness of claims, the plaintiffs should not
have continued to press their case.' Second, the court denied the plaintiffs'
claim that Congress did not intend the government, as a defendant, to
benefit from an award of attorney fees because of a plaintiff's failure to
prove that the government had violated that plaintiff's rights. 5 2 Third, the
Fourth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court's sanction
for improper purpose because the plaintiffs' abandonment of claims between
the time of filing the suit and the pretrial brief constituted a "cavalier
attitude" toward the government's resources.5 3 Finally, the Fourth Circuit
found no abuse of discretion in the district court's finding that the suits
had no basis in fact.'54
The Fourth Circuit opinion questions why the Rule 11 movant never
moved for summary judgment during district court proceedings. 5 5 Instead,
the defendant moved for Rule 11 sanctions and awaited the' district court's
independent decision on the Rule 11 motion, which ultimately held the
plaintiffs' claims without merit. 5 6 According to the Fourth Circuit, the
defendant's failure to move for summary judgment led to the continuation
of unnecessary and frivolous litigation, at great cost to judicial resources,
and increased the defendant's own costs, which, consequently, became the
basis of a Rule 11 sanction against the plaintiffs.'1 7 The Fourth Circuit
pointed out that the court could have reached a more efficient result if the
government had made an early motion for summary judgement, however,
Judge Wilkinson did not punish the government for this oversight. 5,
Blue is also an example of a Fourth Circuit court's consideration of
mitigating factors in determining an appropriate sanction amount. In Blue,
despite the Fourth Circuit's agreement with the district court that the conduct
of the attorneys was sanctionable, the Fourth Circuit did not agree with
the amount of sanctions. The court of appeals found that the district court's
sanctions were unprecedented in "breadth and magnitude.' ' 5 9 The amounts

150. Id. at 536.
151. Id. at 537.
152. Id. at 537-38.
153. Id. at 539.
154. Id. at 540.
155. Id. at 535. In Blue the Fourth Circuit inquired of the government, defendant, why
it had sought sanctions from the plaintiffs instead of moving for summary judgment earlier
in the litigation. Id. The Fourth Circuit disapproved of the government's waiting for the
plaintiffs to drop their claims before moving for sanctions. Id. The court went on to state the

principle that "[a]s a general matter, dismissal of a frivolous Title VII case on the merits
should be a first option, whereas imposition of sanctions should be a matter of last resort."

Id.
156. Id. at 535, 542.

157. Id. at 535.
158. Id. at 535-36.
159. Id. at 535.
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were so large that Judge Wilkinson feared that the sanctions would compromise the very purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because attorneys
would develop a lasting reluctance to represent civil rights causes in the
future60 Additionally, Judge Wilkinson found that the district court took
too narrow a view of its authority to consider equitable and mitigating
factors of the case with respect to imposing appropriate sanctions.' 6' The
mitigating factors that the district court failed to recognize were: the failure
of the government to move for summary judgment early in the litigation
process; 62 the junior associate's relative inexperience; 63 the entrance of the
junior associate at an advanced stage of the litigation;'" and the reality
that the junior associate merely followed the directions of a senior partner
in charge of the case. 6 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit set aside all
sanctions against the associate.'" In contrast, the experienced senior partner's past pr6fessional distinction did not serve to lessen the senior partner's
culpability in this case. 67 Rather, the court found that to relieve the senior
partner of sanctions in this case would be to hold more established members
of the legal profession above the reach of the law.'" Therefore, the Fourth
69
Circuit affirmed sanctions against the more experienced attorney.

(3) PROCEDURAL SAnGuARDs
While courts justify inconsistent sanction amounts by arguing that Rule
1l's purpose is not to reimburse, 70 courts explain inconsistent use of
procedural safeguards in Rule 11 cases as the courts' efforts to minimize
satellite litigation.' 7 ' Rule 11 does not require courts to hold a separate
hearing on sanctions. 7 2 In the interest of reducing the satellite litigation
which results from Rule 11 sanctions, the Fourth Circuit does not require
evidentiary hearings before imposing sanctions. 7 Nevertheless, in numerous
160. Id.
161. Id. at 546.
162. Id. at 535. In Blue the government, instead of making an early motion for summary
judgement, waited until the plaintiffs dropped their claims before moving for Rule 11 sanctions.
Id.
163. Id. at 546. Blue was the junior associates' first case. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 546-47. In Blue the Fourth Circuit did not require the senior partner to
shoulder the burden of the sanctions erroneously imposed on the junior associate by the district
court. Id. at 547.
168. Id. In Blue the Fourth Circuit also stated that if the senior partner were pardoned
here, because of his excellent reputation, the pardon would lead district courts to take on
"reputationa measurement" with each Rule 11 dispute. Id.
169. Id.
170. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (explaining that purpose of Rule 11 is

deterrence not reimbursement).
171. See infra notes 173, 185 and accompanying text (discussing court's fears that
additional procedural safeguards attendant to Rule 11 sanctions will result in increase in satellite
litigation).
172. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (omitting requirement that hearings precede sanctions);
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cases the district courts do conduct full evidentiary hearings. 74 In an
evidentiary hearing, courts are likely to disregard precedent holding that
courts shall limit analysis to an objective reasonableness review of attorney
conduct and to lapse into consideration of an attorney's subjective reason175
ableness in pleading or filing.
The evidentiary hearing is the product of appellate court concern over
76

sanctions imposed without the support of complete district court findings.
Fourth Circuit judges have expressed considerable concern when district
1 77
courts fail to establish an adequate record to support Rule 11 sanctions.

In fact, many Fourth Circuit judges do not hesitate to remand a district
court sanction because the court failed to establish its reasoning in the
record.1 78 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit demands not only a record in support

Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (indicating that to extent possible courts should
limit satellite litigation over sanctions and separate hearings).
173. See In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 521-22 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining that evidentiary
hearings are not required when sanctions imposed for improper purpose but that hearings are
valuable safeguard to other violations of Rule 11), reh'g denied, No. 89-2815 (4th Cir. Oct.
11, 1990), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-807 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1990). The Fourth Circuit stated
that failure of a court to provide hearing does not deprive sanctioned attorneys of due process.
Id. at 521. The court further states that where the same judge presiding over the underlying
action is to be the sanctioning judge, the judge's participation in the event is adequate to give
the judge full knowledge of relevant facts. Id. at 522.
174. See generally Blue v. United States Department of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir.
1990) (conducting hearing before sanctioning under Rule 11), petition for cert. filed, No. 901076 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1990). AGS Genasys Corp. v. Nixon, 908 F.2d 966 (4th Cir. July 11,
1990) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw) (same); Green v. Foley, 907 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir. June
6, 1990) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw) (same); Coker's Mobile Home Plaza Inc. v. ITT
Commercial Fin. Corp., 900 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. March 13, 1990) (Unpublished, text on
Westlaw) (same); Almi Pictures, Inc. v. WFTY, Inc., 894 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 1990)
(Unpublished, text on Westlaw) (same); In re McKissick, 856 F.2d 187 (4th Cir. Aug. 16,
1988) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw) (same); Baldwin v. Boone, 812 F.2d 1400 (4th Cir. Feb.
6, 1987) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw) (same).
175. See supra notes 46-99 and accompanying text (discussing subjective elements in
analysis of attorney's intent in filing).
176. See infra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing district court leaving inadequate
record in support of sanctions). See generally In re Scarlett, 907 F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. June 12,
1990) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 10-11) (remanding for clarification of basis for sanction
amount); Corcoran v. I.B.M, 896 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. Jan. 30, 1990) (Unpublished, text on
Westlaw at 9-10) (remanding for lack of explanation of sanction amount on record).
177. See AGS Genasys Corp., 908 F.2d 966 (text on WestIaw at 6-7) (admonishing district
court's imposition of sanctions without support in record). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
sanction stating "although at least a short statement of reasons for a Rule 11 ruling would
usually be preferable, we decline to adopt a rule requiring remand every time a district court
fails to announce its reasons for denying sanctions[.]" Id. But see supra note 112 and
accompanying text (citing cases remanding Rule 11 sanctions for failure of district court to
establish record in support of decision).
178. See Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 855 (4th Cir. 1990) (remanding sanctions for
failure to establish reasons in record); Ervin v. Traxler, 829 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1987)
(Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 5-6) (same); LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Federal Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 830 F.2d 522, 528 (4th Cir. 1987) (remanding for dismissing Rule 11 motion without
developing a record), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1065 (1988). See also supra note 112 and
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of a sanction, but also a record in support of a denial of sanctions.

79

This

requirement is evident in one Fourth Circuit case where the appellate court
remanded a district court's refusal to impose sanctions that the district court
did not support with reasons in the record. 8 0 Therefore, the evidentiary
hearing held at the district court level not only provides the sanctioned
party with due process,'' but also eliminates some of the risk that the

appellate court will remand for failure to establish a record in support of
sanctions.
Due process requirements demand that when deprivations of a property
interest, such as large monetary fines, or a liberty interest, such as disbar-

ment, are at issue, the court must meet sufficient procedural and substantive
due process requirements.1 2 When Rule 11 sanctions are at issue an eviden-

tiary hearing satisfies the due process requirement." 3 In some Rule 11 cases
the court, sua sponte, will impose sanctions and order a hearing.'14 In other
cases, the court will order a hearing after one of the parties to the suit has
made a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. 8 5 Although due process requirements

are met adequately through a hearing, in some cases the court may feel a
hearing is an unnecessary waste of judicial resources and only will encourage
satellite litigation.1 6 A significant conflict exists between the drafters' intent

accompanying text (citing cases remanding Rule 11 sanctions for failure of district court to
establish record in support of decision).
179. See LaVay, 830 F.2d at 528 (remanding for district court's failure to establish
adequate record supporting denial of Rule 11 sanctions).
180. See Coker's Mobile Home Plaza, Inc. v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 900 F.2d 250
(4th Cir. March 13, 1990) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 18-19) (remanding district court's
denial of sanctions for failure to include court's reasoning for its denial in record).
181. See infra notes 182-189 and accompanying text (discussing satisfaction of due process
requirements through evidentiary hearing).
182. See In re Kunstler 914 F.2d 505, 523-24 (4th Cir. 1990) (discussing district court's
denial of sanctions hearing), reh g denied, No. 89-2815 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 1990), petition for
cert. filed, No. 90-807 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1990). In Kunstler the Fourth Circuit found that because
of the size of the sanction and the district court's denial of a hearing on the reasonableness
of the fee statements, the plaintiff's did not have adequate opportunity to respond to type
and amount of sanctions imposed. Id. at 522, 524.
183. Id. at 522 (stating that although hearings not necessary in every Rule 11 case, hearings
are of value where court makes judgments about litigants' credibility).
184. See Blair v. Shenandoah Women's Center, 757 F.2d 1435, 1436-37 (4th Cir. 1985)
(affirming sanction imposed when district court made motion for sanction hearing on own
initiative). But see Childers v. United States, 542 F.2d 1243, 1246 (4th Cir. 1976) (affirming
district court decision not to sanction when district court did not hold hearing because no
relevant facts were in dispute although petitioner challenged court's denial of hearing).
Noteworthy is that in the recent Fourth Circuit decision In re Kunstler, the court found
that when the same judge hearing the underlying action is to preside over a Rule 11 evidentiary
hearing, "further hearing on the sanctions issue may well be not only unnecessary but also a
waste of judicial resources." Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 521.
185. See Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding hearing on Rule 11 issue
after plaintiffs requested attorney's fees).
186. See Childers, 542 F.2d at 1246 (affirming sanctions without hearing because no
relevant facts were in dispute although petitioner challenged court's denial of hearing); Kunstler,
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to curb litigation costs, waste of judicial resources, and frivolous suits, and
the sanctioned individual's constitutional rights to receive notice and have
an opportunity to be heard. Courts have not resolved this conflict.18 7 In
contrast to the claim that Rule 11 evidentiary hearings increase litigation,
an evidentiary hearing actually may reduce satellite litigation. 8' An evidentiary hearing provides a more complete record at the district court level in
support of either a denial or a grant of sanctions, thereby eliminating the
cause of most remands by the Fourth Circuit.3 9
Ervin v. Traxler 90 is an example of a Fourth Circuit case that resulted
in a great deal of unnecessary litigation which the district court could have
eliminated if it had held an evidentiary hearing. In Ervin the Fourth Circuit
decided whether a district court judge improperly based Rule 11 sanctions
on the plaintiffs' out of court conduct. 9' Ervin stemmed from a suit in
state court wherein the plaintiffs sought appointment as guardians ad litem
for one plaintiffs daughter (an unwed mother of thirteen) and the daughter's
illegitimate son.'9 The daughter and grandson needed a guardian ad litem
to institute a suit for damages against a hospital for injuries to the
grandson. 93 The state court refused to appoint the plaintiffs as guardians,
and the plaintiffs removed the case to federal court claiming a violation of
their constitutional rights.'9 The federal district court ruled that it had no
subject matter jurisdiction over the case and imposed Rule 11 sanctions
against the plaintiffs without providing reasons for sanctions on the record.1 9s The Fourth Circuit remanded to the district court for failure to
establish a proper record.'9 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the need for
an adequate record especially was great in this case because the record at
trial revealed a probability that the district court judge based sanctions on
the plaintiffs' "extrajudicial" conduct, which is not conduct within the

914 F.2d at 521-22 (noting that although hearing is valuable in establishing reasons for Rule
11 sanction hearing not necessary when same judge hears underlying action and imposes
sanctions).
187. See Hsiung, supra note 43, at 397 (stressing need to keep procedural safeguards at
minimum while comporting with due process requirements); Note, CriticalAnalysis of Rule
11 Sanctions in the Seventh Circuit, 72 MARQuETrE L. REv. 91, 110-11 (1989) (same); Burbank,
The Report o the Third Circuit Task Force on FederalRule of Civil Procedure11: An Update,
19 SEToN HALL L. Ray. 511, 515-16 (1989) (same); Note, Rule 11 Sanctions: Toward Judicial
Restraint, 26 WAs=mN L. J.337, 361-62 (1987) (same).
188. See infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text (discussing ways hearings could cut
down on necessity of appellate courts to remand to district courts).
189. See supra notes 176-181 and accompanying text (discussing appellate courts" remands
for failure to establish adequate findings in support or denial of sanctions).
190. 829 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1987) (Unpublished, text on Westiaw).
191. Ervin v. Traxler, 829 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1987) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw
at 6).
192. Id.at 2.
193. Id.at 3.
194. Id.at 2.
195. Id.at 5-6.
196. Id.at 6.
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province of Rule 11.197 The Fourth Circuit found the record to show that
the plaintiffs angered the district court judge when they made a public
statement that federal judges in South Carolina did not take civil rights
cases seriously. 98 After the district court judge expressed his anger, the
judge improperly imposed Rule 11 sanctions, without a sanctions hearing.'9
A requirement that the district court judge put findings in the record could
have prevented the improper sanctions in Ervin because a hearing would
have forced the judge to examine his reasons for imposing sanctions. An
evidentiary hearing process, therefore, likely would prevent a judge from
imposing unjustified sanctions.
In addition to Rule 11 hearings, several Fourth Circuit decisions endorse
as an effective procedural safeguard against unnecessary expenditures of
time, resources, and money, advance notice to the opposing party of a
litigant's intent to make a Rule 11 motion. 2°° The Fifth Circuit agrees with
this proposition and requires timely notice of a party's intent to pursue
Rule 11 sanctions. 2°' The Fifth Circuit suggests that upon receipt of notice,
the nonmoving attorney, from that point forward, is more likely to put
forth extra effort to present that attorney's client's case as supported by
both law and fact. 20 2 Additionally, the court, from the point of notice
forward, would take note of all evidence of legal and factual inquiry or
lack thereof, thereby establishing a more complete record of Rule 11 issues. 2 3
Unfortunately, neither the federal rule, nor any Fourth Circuit decision,
holds advance notice to be mandatory. 204 Advance notice to the opposing

197. Id.
198. Id. at 5-6. In Ervin the record revealed that just before the district court judge
announced that Rule 11 sanctions were awarded the judge accused the plaintiffs of twice
attacking the judiciary. Id.
199. Id. at 6.
200. See In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 512-13 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that although no
requirement exists that moving party give advance notice to opponent under Rule 11, moving
party may avoid court's consideration of that party's failure to give notice if moving party
gives notice of intent to move for Rule 11 sanctions at earliest possible date), reh'g denied,
No. 89-2815 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 1990), petitionfor cert. filed, No. 90-807 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1990).
In Kunstler the plaintiffs, alleged Rule 11 violators, asserted as a defense that the defendants
failed to give notice of their intent to move for sanctions under Rule 11. Id. at 512. The court
recognized the equitable basis for this argument but found no express requirement that notice
be given. Id. at 513; see also Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (stating that party
seeking sanctions should give prompt notice to both court and offending party).
201. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 880 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
that Fifth Circuit recognizes importance of prompt action by parties to Rule 11 case and
recommends that party seeking Rule 11 sanctions give notice of that intent and that notice be
made part of record).
202. Id. at 881.
203. Id. at 880 n.21 (noting significance of nexus between notice and behavior that drafters
of Rule 11 sought to be deter).
204. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 11 (omitting express requirement that attorney moving for Rule
11 sanctions give notice to opponent of that intent). But see Advisory Committee Notes supra,
note 10 (stating that party seeking sanctions should give prompt notice to both court and
offending party).
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party and to the court could negate the need for an evidentiary hearing.205
Notice requirements necessarily would be a vehicle for getting evidence of
Rule 11 violations on the record, thereby cutting down on evidentiary
hearings, satellite litigation, and the need for remand on appeal.?9

(4) MODFCATION, ExPAsoN,

REVERSAL

In addition to Rule 11 's drafters' encouragement that litigants give
notice of intent to move for Rule 11 sanctions, the drafters also encourage
that courts not unnecessarily chill attorney enthusiasm. 7 The drafters
intended only to curb the impact of frivolous litigation in federal courts.?
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11 encourage attorneys with valid
arguments in support of modification, expansion, or reversal of existing
law, to come forward with claims. 9 As a result, federal courts must make
difficult distinctions between valid attempts to alter existing law and attempts
brought forward without any basis in law. 21 0 The Fourth Circuit has recognized the importance of protecting parties asserting a change in the law
2
and, in Dostert v. Harshbarger,
" has reversed Rule 11 sanctions in this
interest. In Dostertthe Fourth Circuit decided whether a plaintiff had shown
a good faith effort to modify, extend, or reverse existing law.2 12 The plaintiff
was a former state judge. 2 1 The district court opinion labeled the plaintiff
as generally disliked during his career and as consistently embroiled in
controversy. 21 4 Moreover, while still on the bench, a jury found the plaintiff
guilty of criminal contempt. 21 Subsequent to the jury conviction, a Judicial

205. See Advisory Committee Notes supra, note 10 (encouraging party seeking sanctions
to give prompt notice to both court and offending party to cut down on excess litigation)
206. Ripple & Saalman, Rule 11 in the Constitutional Case, 63 NomRE DAm L. REv.
788, 803 (1988) (citing Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 881 (5th Cir. 1988)

for proposition that notice of intent to seek Rule 11 sanctions cuts down on litigious burdens);
see also supra notes 200-205 and accompanying text (same).
207. See Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d 984, 988 (4th Cir.
1987) (finding prevention of groundless suits to be purpose of Rule 11 not chilling of advocacy).
In Azcon Scrap the Fourth Circuit stated, "[t]he Rule does not seek to stifle the exuberant
spirit of skilled advocacy or to require that a claim be proven before a complaint can be filed
...The Rule attempts to discourage the needless filing of groundless lawsuits." Id.
208. Id.

209. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (stating that Rule 11 is not intended
to chill attorney enthusiasm or creativity to pursue factual or legal theories).
210. See Dostert v. Harshbarger, 911 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. July 18, 1990) (Unpublished,
text on Westiaw at 11-12) (disagreeing with district court finding that plaintiff did not state
argument attempting to extend, modify, or reverse existing law) In Dostert the Fourth Circuit
could not affirm the sanctions because the extension of established precedent was not "beyond
the realm of credibility." Id. at 12.
211. 911 F.2d 721 (text on Westiaw at 12); see also Carlton v. Franklin, 911 F.2d 721
(4th Cir. Aug. 2, 1990) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 19-20) (stating lower court refused
to sanction because state law unsettled in area of complaint).
212. Dostert, 911 F.2d 721 (text on Westlaw at 11).
213. Id. at 4.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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Investigation Commission found that the plaintiff was unable to continue
his duties due to advancing age and physical incapacity. 2 6 In an action
instituted by the plaintiff before the Supreme Court of West Virginia, that
court refused to consider the judge's request for retirement benefits. 2 7 The
plaintiff then sued the West Virginia Supreme Court judges in federal court
claiming that the denial of his retirement benefits violated his right to due
process. 21 The district court dismissed the case and sanctioned the plaintiff
for filing a claim with no legal basis. 2 9 The court reasoned that because
judges are immune from suit when acting within their judicial capacity, the
plaintiff did not have a legallclaim against the West Virginia Supreme Court
judges2 0 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the Rule 11 sanctions on
the ground that the plaintiff sufficiently claimed that the suit attempted to
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. 221
The Fourth Circuit's willingness to protect litigants who attempt to
extend, modify, or reverse existing law, however, is not unlimited. In Cabell
v. Petty2 the district court sanctioned an attorney for failing to put good
faith intentions on the face of a pleading, thereby frustrating the court's
ability to distinguish the good complaints from the bad.M In Cabell litigants
again presented to the Fourth Circuit the issue whether an attorney in filing
a complaint successfully exhibited an intent to extend, modify, or reverse
existing law.tm The case began as a civil action filed against the Commonwealth of Virginia and the Commonwealth Attorney for the City of Lynchburg. m The plaintiff alleged that a Virginia state court was negligent in
returning a firearm to a youthful offender after that court had convicted
the youth of assault with a deadly weapon. 226 Two and one-half weeks after
the court returned the firearm to the youth, the youth shot and killed the
plaintiff's husband. 227 Following the filing of the, plaintiff's suit, the attorney
for the Commonwealth answered the complaint, made a motion to dismiss,
and notified the plaintiff's attorney of the Commonwealth's intention to
216. Id. at 5.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 6.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 11-12.
222. 810 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1987).
223. See Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that because weight
of existing law was overwhelmingly in favor of defendants, only excuse petitioner could have
for filing claim would be attempt to extend, modify, or reverse existing law). In Cabell the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the imposition of a sanction because the court saw no indication that
plaintiff's counsel sought a modification of the law. Id. The Cabell decision effectively requires
every attorney wishing to assert a change in the law, to say so clearly in each filing. Id.
224. Id. at 466; see also supra note 212 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit
decision raising question whether litigant put forth good faith effort to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law).
225. Cabell, 810 F.2d at 464.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 464-65.
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pursue Rule 11 sanctions. 8 The district court subsequently dismissed the
case because the weight of existing law was overwhelmingly in favor of the
Commonwealth.? 9 The district court did not impose sanctions, however,
reasoning that Rule 11 sanctions were inappropriate because the plaintiff's
attorney may have intended to make an argument for reversal of precedent,
but then had a change of mind.230 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court's denial of sanctions finding that no objective indication
appeared in the record showing that the offending attorney sought a good
faith reversal of the law. 231 The Cabell decision effectively requires every
attorney intending to assert a change in the law clearly to say so in the
2
I
attorney's filing with the court. 31
Attorneys may interpret a requirement that attorneys state an intent to
extend, modify, or reverse existing law on the face of pleadings merely as
another restriction on attorney creativity. Such an interpretation may be
reasonable because courts often reject an attorney's creative efforts to fit
the facts of a current case into the law of one previously decided, but only
marginally on point. The United States Supreme Court has yet to address
the issue of how attorneys should present a good faith effort to extend,
modify, or reverse existing law. The Court easily could resolve controversy
over the rule by adopting a clear requirement that attorneys state any
intention to extend, modify, or reverse existing law in their complaints.
Such a requirement, however, would limit severely a judge's ability to avoid
sanctions when a judge is in doubt about whether the attorney is trying to
modify existing law or trying to mislead the court regarding the substance
of existing law. Unfortunately, a requirement that attorneys state intentions
to expand, modify, or reverse existing law on the face of the complaint or
automatically be subject to sanctions would eliminate one creative outlet to
Rule 11 sanctions, perhaps with harsh results.233
(5)

ALLOCATION OF SANCTION BETWEEN ATToRNEY AND CLIENT

Courts would undoubtedly sanction only an attorney, and not the
attorney's client, for failing to assert an effort to extend, modify, or reverse
existing law. Most Rule 11 sanctions, however, result from faulty legal
grounds and the great majority of Fourth Circuit Rule 11 decisions sanction
the attorney as the violator. 234 Nevertheless, courts have sanctioned both
pro se litigants and litigants with counsel?' Where a court sanctions a
layperson it usually sanctions the client's attorney as well,236 although the

228. Id. at 465.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 466.
231. Id.
232. Id. In Cabell the Fourth Circuit noted that from the available record no objective
indication was apparent that the plaintiff intended to seek a modification of the law. Id.
233. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (warning against possible chilling
effects of Rule 11).
234. See Note, Rule 11 Sanctions: Contrasting Applications in the Second and Fourth
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Fourth Circuit has sanctioned at least two pro se litigants.2 Furthermore,
several Fourth Circuit cases impose sanctions on clients alone even though
counsel represented the client. 238 For example, the Fourth Circuit decision
in Green v. FoleyA9 sanctioned only the client because the attorney claimed
that the client lied to the attorney.24 On the other hand, where the court
finds that the client filed with an improper purpose and that the attorney
failed to conduct adequate legal inquiry, the Fourth Circuit has held the
attorney and client jointly and severally liable. 241 The Fourth Circuit readily
sanctions a client if the client also is an attorney. 242
Evidence, however, exists that courts do not hold clients to the same
objective reasonableness standard that the courts expect of attorneys.3 3
Circuits, 46 MD. L. Rav. 470, 482 (1987) (discussing rarity of client sanctions). Compare T.
RuLE 11 SANcrxNwOn
PROCESS, 76 (1988) (giving numerical survey of published
Rule 11 decisions from federal courts). This study reveals that federal courts sanctioned clients
in approximately half of cases in which any sanctions were imposed. Id.
235. See infra notes 236-242 and accompanying text (discussing instances when court
sanctions client and attorneys under Rule 11).
236. See Almi Pictures, Inc. v. WFTY, Inc., 894 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 1990)
(Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 5) (sanctioning both client and attorney). The plaintiffs in
Almi Pictures attached to their complaint an altered version of the original contract with the
defendant. Id. at 4. The court imposed sanctions of $50,000 against the plaintiffs, allocating
only $1,000 to the plaintiff's counsel. Id. at 5. The apportionment was made according to the
relative degrees of fault, the clients being more culpable than counsel. Id. However, the court
found that inconsistencies between the altered contract and the complaint should have put the
attorney on notice. Id.; see also In re Scarlett, 907 F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. June 12, 1990)
(Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 3) (remanding sanction of attorney back to district court
for apportionment of sanction between both "guilty parties", client and attorney); Cohen v.
Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 788 F.2d 247, 248-250 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding attorney and client
jointly and severally liable for $2,814.14 sanction).
237. See Baldwin v. Boone, 812 F.2d 1400 (4th Cir. Feb. 6, 1987) (Unpublished, text on
Westlaw at 4) (affirming sanctions for fraud on inmate appearing pro se who previously filed
portions of claim in federal court); Zaidi v. Edwards, 829 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. Sept. 22, 1987)
(Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 3-4) (affirming sanctions against pro se litigant who brought
action to enjoin closing of school from which he graduated and who sought damages of
$25,000).
238. See Green v. Foley, 907 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir. June 6, 1990) (Unpublished, text on
Westlaw at 6) (affirming sanctioning of client under Rule 11). In defense of the motion for
sanctions against him, the plaintiff's attorney claimed his client fooled him along with the
court with the client's lies. Id. at 5. The district court believed the attorney and imposed no
sanctions against him. Id. The court sanctioned the plaintiff in the amount of $20,000, which
was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. Id. at 18; Introcaso v. Cunningham, 857 F.2d 965, 96566 (4th Cir. 1988) (sanctioning client alone).
239. 907 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir. June 6, 1990) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw).
240. Green, 907 F.2d 1137 (text on Westlaw at 5).
241. See Carlton v. Franklin, 911 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 1990) (Unpublished, text on
Westlaw at 22) (finding that attorney filed action without regard to fact that statute of
limitations was time-bar to claim and that client filed with improper purpose to force a quick
settlement and to improve relations with his clients).
242. See In re Scarlett, 907 F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. June 12, 1990) (text on Westlaw at 3)
(remanding sanction award for apportionment between client and attorney finding client guilty
because client was attorney also). In Scarlett the district court judge stated that because the
client was an attorney himself the client's actions were particularly offensive. Id.
243. See Note, CriticalAnalysis of Rule 11 in the Seventh Circuit, 72 MARQ. L. Rav. 91,
Wsutomo,
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Contrary to attorney sanctions, which courts most often impose because of

inadequate legal inquiry, courts are more likely to base client sanctions on
inadequate factual basis or on improper purpose. 2" Therefore, when courts
base a Rule 11 infraction on inadequate legal support the attorney is

responsible.2 5 The Advisory Committee Notes recommend that federal courts
take the layman's lack of legal experience into consideration and sanction
them accordingly. 6 Therefore, courts do not hold clients to as stringent a
standard of conduct as attorneys?27 Given the advisory committee's warning
against chilling litigants' enthusiasm for bringing meritorious suits, the
subjective standard applied to laymen is just.248 The United States Supreme
Court currently is considering whether litigants should be held to the same
objective standard as their attorneys. 249
109-10 (1989) (noting that courts do not impose Rule 11 sanctions on laymen unless blatant
harassment occurs); Untereiner, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE L.J.
901, 914 (1988) (commenting that attorneys are ones who bear sanctions for motions not
warranted by facts or law because client not in position to know whether factual and legal
grounds are sufficient).
244. See Untereiner, supra note 243, at 914 (discussing court's willingness to sanction
clients who provide attorneys with false facts and clients who continuously refile same
complaints using different attorneys). See generally Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162
(N.D. Cal. 1985); Blake v. Nat'l Casualty Co., 607 F. Supp. 189, 193 (C.D. Cal. 1984); Wold
v. Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp. 166 (D.Co. 1983).
245. See Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 607 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating
courts should not expect nonlawyer clients to understand whether legal inquiry sufficient);
Blake, 607 F. Supp. at 193; see also Untereiner, supra note 243, at 915 (opining that judges
should sanction only attorney who prepared legally insufficient submission).
246. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (discussing court's discretion to take
lack of legal advice and situation of a pro se litigant into consideration in fashioning appropriate
sanction).
247. See Standard Applicable to Parties Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 59 U.S.L.W. (BNA)
3439 (Jan. 1, 1991) (discussing whether difference should exist between attorney and layman
reasonableness standards under Rule 11). The article discusses the issue facing Supreme Court
on certiorari from the Ninth Circuit decision in Business Guides Inc. v. Chromatic CommunicationsEnter., 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd, IlI S. Ct. 922 (1991). In Business Guides
the Ninth Circuit imposed sanctions against the plaintiff, for filing a frivolous copyright
infringement suit. 59 U.S.L.W. at 3439. In its decision the Ninth Circuit refused to accept the
argument that a laymen should be sanctioned under Rule 11 only if a layman exhibited bad
faith in filing or answering a claim in-federal court. Id. In the brief submitted to the Supreme
Court the attorney for the petitioner argued that Rule 11 should permit parties to rely on the
advice of counsel as to whether additional verification of facts is necessary prior to filing a
pleading because the duty to develop a claim properly lies with counsel. Id. Additionally, the
petitioner's attorney argued that lawyers are trained to discern tenable from untenable claims,
and laypersons are not, thereby implying that to require the same standard of conduct of an
attorney and a party is unjust. Id.
The U.S.L.W. article also noted that the Second Circuit in Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452 (2nd Cir. 1988) rev'd on other grounds, 493 U.S. 120 (1989)
adopted a more lenient standard of conduct requirement for laymen than for attorneys. Id.
See addendum, infra end of text (discussing Supreme Court's decision on certiorari in Business
Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic CommunicationsEnter., 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991)).
248. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (stating that Rule 11 not intended to
chill attorney enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories).
249. See Business Guides, 892 F.2d at 811 (holding clients and attorneys to same objective
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The Fourth Circuit remains reluctant to impose sanctions against persons
other than violating attorneys. 0 Courts impose sanctions against clients
only where the client brings suit in bad faith or for improper purpose, or
where the client is an attorney and ought to have known better.25 Under
the language of the rule, however, sanctioning the client alone, or apportioning of sanctions between client and attorney, is permissible. 2 Thus,
because the Fourth Circuit adheres to conservative sanctioning of laymen
litigants, no danger of overstepping the purposes of the rule exists.2 3
(6)

SHIFTnI

THE BLAm TO THE CLIENT

While the Fourth Circuit has remained reluctant to sanction the client,
the Fourth Circuit has failed to resolve contradictory decisions on whether
an attorney successfully may defend a Rule 11 motion by passing blame to
the client.2 4 One decision has held that an attorney may not escape liability
simply because the client's behavior is more objectionable than the attorney's
behavior. 2"s In contrast, when the client was an attorney who deliberately
misinformed the hired attorney, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court

standard of reasonableness); see also supra note 247 (explaining issue facing Supreme Court
in Business Guides).
250. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (discussing rarity of sanctions against
laymen).
251. See Untereiner, supra note 243, at 246-47 (stating that courts sanction litigants who
are attorneys because they are in position to recognize legally frivolous filings and courts
sanction nonattorney litigants who provide false facts in bad faith).
252. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (stating that courts may impose sanctions upon signer,
represented party, or both).
253. See Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10 (stressing that purpose of Rule 11 is
deterrence of frivolous claims not deterrence of meritorious claims).
254. See Green v. Foley, 907 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir. June 6, 1990) (Unpublished, text on
Westlaw at 6) (excusing attorney but sanctioning client under Rule 11 because client misled
attorney and court). But see Blair v. Shenandoah Women's Center, 757 F.2d 1435, 1438 (4th
Cir. 1985) (sanctioning attorney and client and holding attorney may not shield own transgressions behind plea that attorney only followed desire of client).
255. Blair, 757 F.2d at 1438. In Blair an abusive husband sued the shelter in which his
wife sought refuge from him with their two children. Id. at 1436. The husband also sued 12
other defendants, including the United Way, the State of West Virginia, unknown police
officer, the county board of education, the county, and several employees of the county. Id.
The district court found that the plaintiff's attorney, "argued his case in a way suggesting
that he had not researched the legal issues at all." Id. The attorney argued that sanctions
against him should be set aside because: (I) the attorney's forced representation of both
himself and the client at the sanctions hearing prejudiced the attorney's ability to defend
himself, (2) the court made no finding that he acted in bad faith, and (3) the court should
not assess fees against him absent a showing that he was more culpable than his client. Id. at
1438.
The Fourth Circuit found Blair's claim of prejudice unfounded reasoning that if anyone
was prejudiced in the evidentiary hearing his client was, not the attorney. Id. Furthermore,
the court held that Rule 11 does not permit a lawyer to shield his transgressions behind the
simplistic claim that he only did what his client desired. Id. Finally, the court held that an
attorney does not escape liability just because his client's poor behavior was worse than the
attorney's. Id.
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decision to sanction only the client and not the hired attorney.2 "6
To maintain a consistent application of Rule 11 to attorneys and laymen,
and to realize the purposes of Rule 11, courts should employ a two-part
test in reviewing attorney and layman conduct .2 7 A court should first
determine whether the attorney acted reasonably and then move to an
investigation of whether the client is at fault.258 Under this test, the attorney
carries the initial burden to prove that the attorney's investigations were
reasonable under an objective standard. 219 The court should then examine
the client's conduct even if the attorney has successfully defended the
attorney's own actions.3 This approach is followed in Almi Pictures, Inc.
v. WFTY, Inc.261 In Almi the court decided whether the plaintiff's attorney
adequately inquired into the factual basis for the suit. The plaintiff claimed
a breach of contract arising out of a failed movie license agreement. 2 2 The
basis of the complaint was the written agreement between the parties, and
3
the plaintiff provided a photocopy of that agreement to its attorney.
During the course of discovery the parties became aware that one of the
plaintiff's employees had altered the photocopy so that it was no longer
true to the original agreement. 2" The district court first addressed the
attorney's culpability and reasoned that inconsistencies between the complaint and the photocopied contract should have alerted the attorney that

256. Green, 907 F.2d 1137 (text on Westlaw at 6) (excusing attorney on plea that client
fooled attorney and the court with client's lies).
257. See In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 518 (4th Cir. 1990) (suggesting two-part test similar
to test proposed in text), reh'g denied, No. 89-2815 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 1990), petition for cert.
filed, No. 90-807 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1990). In Kunstler Judge Wilkinson recommends a two-part
test constituting first, an analysis of the factual and.legal basis of a claim, and, second, an
analysis of any improper purpose. Id. This text recommends the same two-part test: First, the
courts should look to an attorney's reasonableness, which is determined by the factual and
legal basis in support of a claim; and second, the court should inquire into the client's good
faith or bad faith conduct.
258. See Green, 907 F.2d 1137 (Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 6) (affirming district
court finding that client in violation of Rule 11 and that attorney not guilty of violation of
Rule 11).
259. See supra notes 34-99 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of objective
standard of reasonableness).
260. See supra notes 243-249 and accompanying text (discussing different requirements of
reasonableness with respect to attorneys and clients); see also supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (proposing that objective reasonableness standard appropriate for review of
attorney's inquiry into legal and factual basis for claim and that subjective standard is
appropriate for improper purpose prong).
261. 894 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. Jan. 12, 1990) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 4-7) The
Almi court affirmed the district court finding that the attorney did not conduct adequate
factual inquiries after the client provided the lawyer with a photocopy of the disputed contract
that was not faithful to the original. Id. The district court held that inconsistencies between
the complaint, contract and the photocopy of the contract, should have alerted the attorney
that more investigation into the factual support for the claim was necessary. Id. at 5.
262. Id. at 3.
263. Id. at 4.
264. Id.
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more inquiry was necessary. 265 Accordingly, the court entered summary
judgement for defendant WFTY, and imposed a $50,000 sanction against
the plaintiff for failure to conduct adequate prefiling inquiry. 26 The court
then assessed the relative degrees of fault between the plaintiff's attorneys
and the plaintiff and determined the attorney's sanction to be $1,000, and
the plaintiff's sanction to be $49,000.267 Although the Fourth Circuit did
not discuss the allocation of sanctions to the plaintiff, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the sanctions against both the attorney and the plaintiff, reasoning
that if the attorney had conducted a reasonable inquiry into the facts and
law of the case, the attorney could have discovered the misrepresentation.
In Almi, therefore, the district court performed the two-part test by first
determining that the plaintiff's prefiling inquiry was inadequate under Rule
11 and by next assessing the relative fault of the attorney and the client. 269
The Fourth Circuit again performs the two-part test in Green v. Foley.270
In Green the plaintiff filed suit to collect payment on notes against the
defendant guarantor. 271 During the proceedings, the defendant discovered
and revealed that the plaintiffs involvement with the notes was a sham
transaction. 272 The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the
defendant and considered the defendant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions
against the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney. 273 The district court excused
the attorney from sanctions because the attorney claimed to have been
fooled along with the court by his client's fraud. 274 The district court then
imposed sanctions against the plaintiff. 275 The Fourth Circuit affirmed,
reasoning that the plaintiff had exhibited bad faith and that the district
27 6
court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions only on the client.
In Green the Fourth Circuit's separate treatment of the attorney's
reasonableness and the offending client's bad faith enabled the court to
arrive at a fair imposition of sanctions. 277 Although the court did not
expressly state that it was applying a two-part test, in effect, the separate
consideration of attorney and client conduct constituted a two-part analysis.
Because the language of Rule I1 gives district courts the authority to sanction
both attorneys and parties, a two-part analysis ensures that sanctionable

265. Id.
266. Id.

267. Id. at 5.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id.
Id.
907 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir. June 6, 1990) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw).
Green v. Foley, 907 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir. June 6, 1990) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw

at 3).
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
See Id. at 14-15 (discussing equitable considerations including client's concealment

of fraud as justification to affirm district court's sanctions of client alone).
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conduct of all litigants is revealed to the court and that the deterrence
objectives of the rule are effectively served. 2 8
(7)

REmovAL oF CAsEs

In addition to the Fourth Circuit's failure to resolve whether an attorney
may shift blame for frivolous filings to the client, the Fourth Circuit has
not resolved the issue whether frivolous pleadings filed in a state court and
subsequently removed to federal court are sanctionable.2 19 Similarly, other
circuits are in general disagreement over this issue. 0 In Kirby v. Allegheny
Beverage Corp.28 the Fourth Circuit held that state actions removed to
federal court are not sanctionable. In Kirby the plaintiff originally filed suit
in state court alleging five claims against both his former employer and his
labor union.2 2 The attorney for the defendant union immediately advised
the plaintiff's attorney that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's
claim.2 The Union further threatened to have the case removed to federal
district court if the plaintiff did not withdraw the suit.2 After removal to
federal court, the plaintiff withdrew some claims and the court dismissed
the remainder. The court also imposed Rule 11 sanctions against the
plaintiff's attorney for filing a suit that was both preempted by federal law
and barred by the statute of limitations.u5 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the plaintiff's claims as proper, but reversed the Rule 11
sanctions, reasoning that the language of Rule 11 provides for sanctions
only when a pleading is signed in violation of the rule.26 Therefore, when
an attorney signs a pleading filed in state court and later one of the parties

278. See FED. R. Cwr. P. 11 (authorizing federal courts to sanction signer, represented
party, or both for violations of Rule 11); see also Advisory Committee Notes, supra note 10
(stating that greater attention by district courts to filing abuses should discourage frivolous
filings and abusive tactics).
279. See Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding
district court sanctions improper because plaintiff initially filed and removed action from state
court); Cannon v. Kroger Co., 832 F.2d 303, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1987) (relying on Kirby supra
for proposition stated above); Meadow Ltd. Partnership v. Meadow Farm Partnership, 816
F.2d 970, 970 (4th Cir. 1987) (same). But see Anton Leasing, Inc. v. Engram, 846 F.2d 69
(4th Cir. Apr. 14, 1988) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 3) (sanctioning action filed in state
court but later removed to federal court).
280. See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 915 F.2d 965, 966-68 (5th Cir. 1990) (sanctioning under
Rule 11 state action removed to federal court); Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332,
335 (6th Cir. 1988) (same). But see Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192, 1201 (7th
Cir. 1990) (finding actions removed from state court not sanctionable under Rule 11); In re
Summers, 863 F.2d 20, 21 (6th Cir. 1988) (same); Steifvater Real Estate, Inc. v. Hinsdale, 812
F.2d 805, 809 (2nd Cir. 1987) (same).
281. 811 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1987).
282. Kirby, 811 F.2d, at 254.
283. Id. at 255.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 257.
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removes the action to federal court, the attorney has not signed the pleading
in violation of Rule 11. 287
The Fourth Circuit contradicted the Kirby rule in Anton Leasing, Inc.
v. Engram.288 In Anton the Fourth Circuit decided that when a removal
motion is so patently without legal basis, an "inescapable conclusion" of
bad faith arises, and courts may sanction the motion under Rule 11. 219
Anton involved a dispute over responsibility for damages to a car owned
by the plaintiff car leasing business in Maryland and leased by the defendant
customer who was a resident of West Virginia. 290 By trying to remove the
case from state court in Maryland to federal court in West Virginia, the
defendant's attorney violated a removal statute's clear prohibition of removal to a court other than to the district in which the case is pending. 29'
The district court remanded the case back to state court and imposed Rule
11 sanctions against the defendant's attorney. 292 The Fourth Circuit affirmed,
reasoning that when a motion to remove to federal court is completely
without merit, Rule I I is properly invoked. 29
(8)

CONCLUSION

The Judicial Committee on Rules, in its study of needed changes to
Rule 11, should attempt to develop a distinction between subjective and
objective reasonableness standards. -2 Specifically, an amendment to the
Rule should limit the objective reasonableness standard to the factual and
legal prongs of Rule 11, while applying a subjective reasonableness standard
to the improper purpose prong. 29 To facilitate the use of different standards
of reasonableness to the prongs of Rule 11, the Judicial Conference should
direct federal courts to first inquire whether the factual and legal requirements of the rule are met and then proceed to inquire whether a pleading,
motion, or paper was filed with an improper purpose. 29 Furthermore, the

287. Id.
288. 846 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. Apr. 14, 1988) (Unpublished, text on Westlaw). See also ITT
Indus. Credit Co. v. Durango Crushers Inc., 832 F.2d 307, 308 (4th Cir. 1987) (sanctioning
frivolous motion to remove from state'to federal court).
289. Anton Leasing, Inc. v. Engram, 846 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. Apr. 14, 1988) (Unpublished,
text on Westlaw at 4).
290. Id. at 2.
291. Id. at 3.
292. Id.
293. See id. (failing to cite to Kirby, which Fourth Circuit previously had decided on this
issue). The Kirby decision held that state actions removed to federal court are not sanctionable
under Rule 11. Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1987). Anton
reached an opposite ruling. Anton, 846 F.2d 69 (Unpublished, text on Westlaw at 3).
294. See supra notes 34-99 and accompanying text (discussing controversy over proper
standard of reasonableness, objective or subjective, to apply to Rule 11 analysis).
295. See supra notes 34-99 (discussing necessary subjective elements in analysis of improper
purpose under Rule 11).
296. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing order of inquiry into Rule 11
violations).
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duty and discretion to fashion an appropriate type and amount of sanction
should remain with the district courts. 297 Inconsistent Fourth Circuit sanction
amounts are not a problem because the primary goal of Rule 11 is to deter
future violations. 28 Therefore, depending on the case at hand, lenient or
somewhat harsher sanctions may be appropriate. 29 The Fourth Circuit is
conscientious about keeping sanction amounts low by considering mitigating
factors of a case.2° Specifically, when the nonviolating party fails to mitigate
damages, a court is likely to reduce the Rule 11 sanction.30' Consequently,
courts should impose the least amount necessary to achieve the purposes of
Rule 11. 3°2
Clearly both judges and commentators recognize a need for additional
safeguards to a Rule 11 f'mding. 3°3 As is shown in the Fourth Circuit,
evidentiary hearings provide due process to the offending party and put
evidence in support of a Rule 11 sanction or denial on the record. 304 Either
an amendment of Rule 11 or a Supreme Court decision should effectuate
to
a hearing requirement for all Rule 11 sanctions. The result would be 305
decrease satellite litigation and the waste of judicial time and resources.
Similarly, advance notice by the party intending to seek Rule 11 sanctions
both provides due process to the offending party and alerts the court to
scrutinize a judicial proceeding for violations. 306 If the Judicial Conference
amends Rule 11 to require Rule 11 movants to give advance notice to
district court considpursue sanctions, needless litigation due to inadequate
3°7
eration of the Rule 11 question would decrease.
The Judicial Committee also needs to annunciate clear rules regarding
how attorneys in their filings may properly seek to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. 30 8 As the law now stands in the Fourth Circuit, judges
297. See supra notes 100-169 (discussing methods of calculating sanction amount and
noting that deterrent purposes of Rule 11 make compensation of nonviolating party less
important consideration).
298. See supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text (discussing that large sanction not
necessary to deter future frivolous filings and courts, therefore, closely scrutinize large sanction

awards).
299. Id.

300. See supra notes 104, 110-112, 131-169 (discussing mitigating factors that either
decrease sanction amount to appropriate figure or negate sanctions against less deserving
violator).
301. Id.
302. See supra note 103-112 and accompanying text (discussing courts' general approval
of low sanction amounts that serve purposes of Rule 11).
303. See supra notes 170-206 and accompanying text (discussing appropriate procedural
safeguards to apply before imposing Rule 11 sanctions on violating party).
304. See supra notes 170-199 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of holding
Rule 11 hearing before imposing sanctions).
305. Id.
306. See supra notes 200-202 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of advance
notice as procedural safeguard against unnecessary expenditures of time, resources and money).
307. Id.
308. See infra notes 207-233 and accompanying text (discussing contradictory decisions in
Fourth Circuit regarding how attorney may properly attempt to extend, modify or reverse
existing law in a pleading, motion, or paper filed in federal court).
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are free to deduce from an attorney's frivolous claim, a valid attempt to
reverse existing law. 3°9 Unfortunately, concurrent law exists that subjects an
attorney to sanctions for failure to state on the face of a filing whether the
arguments made therein are an attempt to extend, modify or reverse existing
310
law.
The Supreme Court's imminent decision in Business Guides31' should
clear up dispute over whether attorneys and parties should be held to the
same degree of reasonableness under Rule 11.312 It may be unnecessary,
therefore, for the Judicial Committee to address this issue in an amendment
to Rule 11. The Business Guides decision will label the Fourth Circuit's
sanctioning of laypersons as either proper or improper under
conservative
313
Rule 11.
Finally, contradictory decisions exist in the Fourth Circuit whether or
not an action removed from state to federal court falls within the scope of
Rule 11.314 Either the Judicial Committee or the United States Supreme
Court, therefore, should alleviate this confusion. Hopefully, the amenders
or the United States Supreme Court, in whose hands the future of Rule 11
rests, will act quickly to resolve these issues so that courts may move
forward to effectuate Rule ll's intended purposes:
JEssIcA K. MARTlN

309. See supra notes 211-221 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit decisions
that liberally protect litigant's right to assert change in law).
310. See supra notes 222-232 and accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit decision
that effectively requires attorneys to assert an attempt to extend, modify, or reverse existing
law on face of pleadings).
311. 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
312. See supra note 247 (summarizing issue facing Supreme Court in Business Guides).
313. See supra notes 234-242 and accompanying text (discussing trend of Fourth Circuit
decisions to limit sanctions to attorneys and to sanction clients only after finding improper
purpose).
314. See supra notes 277-291 and accompanying text (discussing contradictory Fourth
Circuit decisions on whether action removed from state to federal court falls within reach of
Rule 11).
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Addendum
In Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Enterprises the Supreme Court
recently resolved whether represented parties and attorneys are held to the
same standard of reasonableness with respect to their conduct under Rule
11. See Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications Enter., 111 S. Ct.
922, 934-35 (1991) (holding that Rule 11 imposes objective standard of
reasonable inquiry on represented parties who sign papers). In Business
Guides a publisher plaintiff brought an action against a competitor company
alleging copyright infringement. Id. at 925. The United States District Court
for the Northern District of California dismissed the action and imposed
Rule 11 sanctions for failure to adequately investigate the basis for the
claim, finding that nine out of the ten charges alleged by the plaintiff were
frivolous. Id. at 926. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sanctions in part,
reasoning that an objective standard of reasonableness applies to both
laymen and attorneys who sign papers submitted to federal court. Id. at
927. The Supreme Court affirmed the sanctions concluding that the language
of Rule 11 clearly mandates application to both represented and unrepresented parties who sign papers submitted to federal court. See id. at 928
(viewing plain language of Rule 11 to require that party who signs pleading
without first conducting reasonable inquiry shall be sanctioned). In response
to the plaintiff's argument that the drafters intended Rule 11 to apply only
to laymen when laymen appeared pro se, the Court held that if the Advisory
Committee to Rule 11 had intended to limit the rule's application to pro
se parties, they would have said so. Id. at 930. The court further held that
represented parties should be held to exactly the same standards of reasonableness as attorneys when factual inquiry is lacking because they are often
in a better position that their attorneys to investigate facts supporting a
paper. Id. at 932. The Court conceded, however, that represented parties
well may be less able to investigate the legal basis for a claim, and, therefore,
courts should apply case by case analysis of what is reasonable under the
circumstances to represented parties who fail to assert adequate legal basis
for a claim. Id. at 933. Lastly, the Court explained that Rule 11 is nota
fee shifting statute because sanctions are not tied to the outcome of the
litigation, and that the rule does not create a cause of action for malicious
prosecution because the main objective for the rule is not to reward the
victims of frivolous filings but to deter baseless filings in the future. Id. at
934-35.
Under the Business Guides decision the Supreme Court requires equal
application of an objective standard of reasonableness to both clients and
attorneys who fail adequately to inquire into the factual basis of a claim.
The decision, however, leaves room for conservative sanctioning of clients
when attorneys fail in their duty to adequately investigate the legal basis
for a claim. Thus, although the Fourth Circuit may have to adhere to
application of the objective standard to clients' factual pleadings, as to the
legal prong of reasonable investigation, the Fourth Circuit's preference for
sanctioning of attorneys over sanctioning of clients is not endangered.

